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NOTES
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF THE
MENTALLY ILL: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCTION
The procedure for involuntary commitment, whether civil or
criminal, creates possibilities of abuse for those confined to men-
tal institutions. Manipulation of the civil commitment process by
venal and unscrupulous relatives has been a serious matter since
the mid-nineteenth century.' Similarly, law enforcement agents
may commit individuals for reasons of security or suspicious con-
duct, without the procedural safeguards assured to those sus-
pected of the commission of crime.2 Once committed, an individ-
ual is often not afforded any effective means with which to chal-
lenge the continuation of his incarceration, thereby having his
medical confinement become the equivalent of life imprison-
ment.' To emphasize the scope of the problem, one need only
consider the fact that annually over 350,000 persons are commit-
ted to mental institutions.'
1. See T. Szasz, LAw, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 58 (1963). The famous case of Mrs.
E.P. Packard, who allegedly was committed by her minister husband to "get rid of her,"
led to her personal crusade to reform the commitment laws in Illinois. At that time,
husbands or guardians had the absolute power to commit married women and infants, and
under this law Mrs. Packard languished in a mental hospital for three years before finally
obtaining release.
2. Kiernan, Detention Varies with Geography, The Washington Star-News, Aug. 5,
1973, at B-1, col. 1. This article recounts the story of Mrs. Elsie Medynski, a Canadian
citizen arrested and confined at St. Elizabeth's Hospital for seventy-two hours without a
hearing. She was suspected of being mentally ill because she was picking up trash and
emptying ashtrays in the lobby of Washington's National Airport while waiting for a
connecting flight. Mrs. Medynski was but one of three persons to be detained at National
Airport in an eight day period and involuntarily confined in a mental institution.
3. T. SzAsz, supra note 1, at 64-5. See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
In that case the Court found that criminal commitment of the petitioner for a minor theft
meant in effect that there would be little probability for eventual release because of the
capacities of Jackson, a severely retarded deaf mute. Examining psychiatrists had testi-
fied that the probability of a recovery sufficient to allow Jackson's release as "cured"
under Indiana criminal commitment standards was very remote. See p. 775 & 793 infra
for a discussion of this case.
4. N.KrfrRiE, THE RIGrr TO BE DIFFERENT 6 (1971). The author states that 384,948
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Aside from the possibility of abuses inherent in the proce-
dure, commitment facilities are being subjected to closer scrutiny
to remove the inhumane conditions characteristic in past de-
cades.' In particular, deficiencies have been found in South Caro-
lina in the areas of funding, staff and patient environment.
Recognizing this problem, the court and legislatures have
increasingly attempted to correct abuses within the mental
health field by restructuring the civil and criminal commitment
process.' In the courts, the remedial tool has been the fourteenth
amendment, the courts finding that the statutory provisions gov-
erning involuntary commitment were violative of due process and
equal protection.
8
The provisions for involuntary commitment in South Caro-
lina are currently being challenged in federal district court in
Alexander v. Hall. This suit involves a class action instituted by
five patients of the South Carolina State Hospital, two of whom
were committed under the criminal commitment procedure. The
complaint alleges that the present South Carolina involuntary
commitment statutes are unconstitutional. In response to this
pending litigation, a bill'0 was introduced in the South Carolina
Senate on June 19, 1973. If enacted, it would substantially change
the current involuntary commitment procedures.
This article will explore and evaluate the proposed legisla-
persons were committed in 1966 to mental institutions of various types. This figure in-
cludes both voluntary and involuntary commitments, as well as those persons placed in
institutions for the feeble-minded.
5. Stucker, S.C. Hospitals Work on 'MajorDeficiencies,'The State (Columbia, S.C.),
Oct. 25, 1973, at 10-C, col. 1.
6. Id. It should be pointed out that both the South Carolina State Hospital and
Crafts-Farrow State Hospital have been given one year by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals to correct "major deficiencies" in the areas of funding, staff
and environment.
7. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (criminal); Heryford v. Parker, 396
F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (civil). For a discussion of Heryford see p. 773 infra.
8. For a more exhaustive study of the constitutional challenges to the existing com-
mitment procedures, the reader is referred to the following: Cohen, The Function of the
Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally III, 44 TEx. L. REV. 424 (1966); Ennis, Civil
Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CaiM. L. BuLL. 101 (1971); Kaplan, Civil Commitment:
"As You Like It," 49 B.U.L. REV. 14 (1969); Wormuth & Murkin, The Doctrine of the
Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964); Note, Hospitalization of the Mentally
Ill: Due Process and Equal Protection, 35 BRooKLYN L. REV. 187 (1969).
9. Civil No. 72-209 (D.S.C., filed Feb. 11, 1972). See note 45 & text infra.
10. No. S.539, A Bill Relating to the Commitment, Admission and Discharge of
Persons from Mental Institutions (1973). As the title indicates this bill is also concerned
with other aspects of the mental health field; however, they are beyond the scope of this
paper.
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INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
tion relating to involuntary commitment in light of the current
provisions, recent court decisions and legislative and administra-
tive responses to the problem in other jurisdictions. Particular
attention will be given to some serious omissions in the proposed
statutory revision and suggestions which might improve the cur-
rent proposal.
The paper has been divided into two sections: (1) "civil"
commitment, involuntary commitment of those not accused or
convicted of a crime, and (2) "criminal" commitment, involun-
tary commitment of those accused or convicted of a crime. An
appendix has been included to provide the reader with the exact
wording of the sections of the proposed code mentioned in this
paper.
I. COMMITMENT OF PERSONS NOT ACCUSED OR CONVICTED OF
CRIMES
A. Present Statutes
South Carolina currently provides for three types of involun-
tary commitment of persons who are mentally ill but who are not
accused or convicted of the commission of a crime. Two of these
are non-emergency procedures which provide for the commitment
of persons who are mentally ill and either need treatment or are
dangerous. The first non-emergency procedure, generally referred
to as admission by a two-physician certificate," is effected with-
out a hearing. The second is judicial admission,12 by which a
person is committed after a hearing before the probate court.
Emergency commitment, the third involuntary procedure, con-
cerns those who are mentally ill and dangerous either to them-
selves or others.'3 This commitment is effected without either a
hearing or authorization by the court, but the commitment must
be endorsed by the probate judge subsequent to the patient's
confinement. 4
The two-physician certificate method, authorized in non-
emergency situations, provides a summary procedure and alter-
nate judicial procedure for unusual circumstances. The two-
physician procedure permits the admission of a patient to the
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-954 (1962).
12. Id. § § 32-958 et seq.
13. Id. § 32-956.
14. Id. § 32-957.
1974]
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state hospital on the written application of either a friend, rela-
tive, spouse, custodian or guardian, or if the individual is in a
medical institution, the superintendent thereof.8 This applica-
tion must be accompanied by a certificate of two designated ex-
aminers, defined by the code as physicians who are specially
qualified in the diagnosis of mental or related illnesses or of men-
tal deficiency." This certificate must attest that the two physi-
cians have examined the individual and found either that he
needs treatment for which his diminished capacity would prevent
him from applying or that he is likely to injure himself or others.
7
If this certificate indicates that the prospective patient is danger-
ous, it can be endorsed by a probate judge. The endorsement
requires that a police officer take the individual into custody and
transport him to the hospital. 8 Therefore, under this procedure
a person may be admitted as a mental patient solely on the
strength of this application and certificate.
If the two-physician certificate procedure cannot be followed
because of inability to locate the prospective patient or other
unusual circumstances, the applicant must present an affidavit
to the probate judge attesting to his belief in the mental illness
of the prospective patient and the reasons why the two-physician
procedure cannot be followed. 9 Acting on this affidavit, the judge
may order the individual taken into custody and examined within
twenty-four hours by two court-designated examiners.2 1 If this
procedure is followed, the legislature has provided that the indi-
vidual taken into custody has the right to be represented by coun-
sel and the right to bail or an immediate examination by desig-
nated examiners; if these requirements are not complied with, the
individual is entitled to release.2'
Under the two-physician procedure, if the superintendent of
the hospital deems it safe, a person admitted to a state hospital
must be released upon his own written request or that of a spouse,
15. Id. § 32-954(1).
16. Id.§ 32-911(6). For the purpose of carrying out this provision, the South Carolina
Mental Health Commission has designated as examiners any physician licensed to prac-
tice medicine under the laws of South Carolina or any medical officer of the government
of the United States who is in the state in performance of his official duties.
17. Id. § 32-954(2).
18. Id. § 32-955.
19. Id. § 32.956.
20. Id. § 32-955.1 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
21, Id. Despite the procedural safeguards, it is still unclear whether Miranda-type
warnings are to be given prior to the commitment proceeding.
[Vol. 25
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adult, relative, guardian, friend, or the applicant for his admis-
sion, if made thirty days or more after his admission. 21 If this
request for release is denied, the patient may be held for fifteen
additional days while judicial admission procedures are begun.2
As a result, the two-physician admission procedure allows a per-
son to be held in a state hospital for a minimum of forty-five days
without having an opportunity to be heard on the issue of his
mental capacity or to be represented by counsel.24
The second procedure for involuntary commitment in non-
emergency situations, judicial admission, is invoked when a
friend, relative, spouse, guardian, or the superintendent of an
institution where the patient is confined files with the probate
court an application similar to the one in the two-physician pro-
cedure.25 This application, however, must be accompanied by a
physician's statement that his examination of the individual de-
termined that he is mentally ill and needs hospitalization, or that
the prospective patient refused to submit to his examination. 8
Generally, notice of this application for judicial admission is
given to the prospective patient, his spouse, parents, and nearest
known other relative or friend. If the court believes that notice is
likely to be injurious to the prospective patient, such notice may
be withheld from him.
27
After filing of the application, the court must appoint two
designated physicians to examine the prospective patient and
report their findings. If the court denies notice of the judicial
admission application and the patient refuses to be examined,
notice must be given before he can be ordered to submit to the
examination.
21
If both examiners believe the patient is mentally ill, the court
22. Id. § 32-972 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
23. Id.
24. In Douglas v. Hall, 229 S.C. 550, 93 S.E.2d 891 (1956), the court held that the
writ of habeas corpus may not be used to challenge involuntary confinement in a mental
institution because adequate procedures to challenge such commitments are provided by
statute. The remedy should be deemed exclusive unless contrary legislative intent is
clearly apparent.
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-958 (1962).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 32.959. The term "injurious" is quite vague. Although it clearly encompas-
ses situations in which the proposed patient might inflict bodily harm on himself, the term
might also be extended to situations where the proposed patient may try to evade the
authorities.
28. Id. § 32-960.
1974]
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must schedule a hearing within fifteen days from receipt of the
examiners' report and give notice of this hearing to the parties
concerned. 9 If either examiner believes the patient is not men-
tally ill, the application for admission is denied."
At the probate court hearing, the prospective patient has the
right to counsel3' and, if indigent, the right to court-appointed
counsel,32 whether or not he is actually present at the hearing.
The hearing is informal, and the court may accept all relevant
and material evidence offered. 3 In making its final determination
on commitment, the court has been provided with a standard to
weigh the pertinent evidence. The court is charged with ordering
commitment if the patient is found to be:
(1) [I]n need of custody, care, or treatment in a hospital, and
because of his condition lacks sufficient insight or capacity to
make responsible decisions with respect to his admittance to a
hospital; or
(2) Because of his condition is likely to injure himself or others.34
The order of the probate court may be appealed to the circuit
court, and a trial de novo with jury will be granted.35 In addition,
after six months of confinement the patient, or another acting on
his behalf, may petition the probate court for a reevaluation of
the confinement order. The costs for this review must be borne
by the patient. 6 Generally, such a post-confinement review is
guided by the same procedural format as the original hearing.3
29. Id. § 32-961.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 32-962.
32. Id.
33. Id. The informality of the hearing procedure and the inclusion of all "relevant and
material" evidence implies that hearsay evidence would be admissible. See p. 779 & note
79 infra. A Wisconsin district court considered this issue in Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972):
To the extent that exceptions to the hearsay rule permit the admission of hear-
say into evidence, the same evidence may be admitted in a civil commitment
hearing. Where standard exclusionary rules forbid the admission of evidence, no
sound policy reasons exist for admitting such evidence in an involuntary com-
mitment hearing.
34. Id. § 32.936.
35. Id. § 32.937. Apparently, appeals may be taken to the court of common pleas in
all cases and under the same conditions as in any other civil action. Appeal must be filed,
however, within fifteen days after notice of the adverse decision.
36. Id. § 32-968. These costs are usually minimal and vary from county to county.
They include minimal fees to the magistrate and such additional expenses as stenographic
costs, witness fees, etc., which the patient may incur.
37. Id.
6
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The third involuntary commitment procedure is specifically
addressed to the admission of those requiring immediate restraint
because they are likely to injure themselves or others." This im-
mediate restraint may be effectuated by anyone's written appli-
cation coupled with a licensed physician's certification." It
should be noted that a physician's certificate alone authorizes
police arrest and incarceration in a state hospital; however, a
probate judge must endorse the certificate within forty-eight
hours after custodial restraint." It appears that this certification
tends to act in these exigent circumstance cases as an arrest
warrant might in regular criminal cases.
As indicated in the previous discussion of the two-physician
commitment procedure, the patient, his family or a friend may
request his release after thirty days or more. 41 This same release
request provision is also available to an individual committed
under the emergency procedure. 42 Likewise, the minimum period
of involuntary confinement is forty-five days for one alleged to be
mentally ill under this procedure but not so adjudicated."
One of the most obvious defects in the present involuntary
commitment statutes is the lack of any standard for determining
whether a non-emergency patient is to be committed by judicial
admission or by the two-physician certification procedure. The
mere existence of this summary certification commitment proce-
dure has made a practical nullity of the judicial admission proce-
dure, which affords the patient some procedural safeguards such
as the right to counsel. Of the 3,723 admissions to the South
Carolina State Hospital in fiscal 1971-72, only two were judicial
commitments, while 1,505 were committed under a two-physician
certificate.44 Thus, it seems that in reality South Carolina only
provides for two types of involuntary commitment procedures,
emergency commitment and admission by a two-physician certif-
icate. As pointed out earlier, neither of these affords the patient
any right to a hearing or judicial determination that he is men-
38. Id. § 32-956(1).
39. Id. § 32-956.
40. Id. § 32-957.
41. See note 10 supra.
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-972 (1962).
43. Id.
44. S.C. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTi, ANNUAL REPORT, 1971-72, 86. According to
the Annual Report, July 1, 1970-June 30, 1971, there were only two judicial admissions,
as compared to 1,536 two-physician certificate admissions of the total 3,553 admissions
to the South Carolina State Hospital for that fiscal year.
1974]
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tally ill. Under both procedures a person may be held in a state
mental hospital for forty-five days without a hearing, and the
commitment may become indefinite if he or someone acting in his
behalf does not submit a written request for his release.
B. Judicial Challenges
Both the physician-certificate commitment procedure and
the emergency procedure are currently being challenged by a suit
which poses questions that have been raised in many states.
Alexander v. Hall45 challenges both the commitment and contin-
ued confinement of plaintiffs committed by involuntary commit-
ment procedures.46
With respect to their commitment orders, the complaint
seems grounded on the theory that persons involuntarily commit-
ted under present law have been deprived of their liberty without
adequate notice of the proceedings against them, without coun-
sel, without a judicial hearing, and without benefit of a recorded
transcript for appeal. In effect, Alexander raises the question
whether rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to persons ac-
cused of crimes should apply to prospective patients in involun-
tary commitment proceedings.
Courts are increasingly answering this question in the affirm-
ative, thus expanding the rights afforded those confined to men-
tal hospitals. Much has been accomplished by using Specht v.
Patterson4 and In re Gault,48 cases involving situations analogous
to the present one. Basically the petitioners in both cases were
denied rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to the criminally
accused, only because they were being dealt with in what was
termed a "civil" proceeding which nevertheless resulted in in-
voluntary confinement. In Specht the court held that the equal
protection clause and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment are applicable to commitment proceedings under the
Colorado Sex Offenders Act" regardless of whether such proceed-
ings are characterized as "civil" or "criminal" commitment.
Under this statute the commitment procedure is triggered when
45. Civil No. 72-209 (D.S.C., filed Feb. 11, 1972). See note 9 & text supra.
46. After having been charged with a crime two of the plaintiffs were also confined
in the State Hospital pursuant to § 32-969 of the South Carolina Code.
47. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
48. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
49. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.19-1 to -10 (1963).
[Vol. 25
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a person is found guilty of certain sex offenses. After conviction
for indecent liberties but prior to sentencing, Specht was sub-
jected to a psychiatric examination, of which a written report was
given to the trial judge. Based on these findings and without
notice and an opportunity to be heard, the trial judge committed
him to an indeterminate term from one day to life as permitted
under the Sex Offenders Act. On appeal the Supreme Court
found that sentencing under the Sex Offenders Act was in fact
punishment criminal in nature and that due process required the
petitioner "[b]e present with counsel, have an opportunity to be
heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right
to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his own."5
Similarly Gault involved the validity of the distinction be-
tween "civil" and "criminal" proceedings. This case concerned
juvenile commitment which the state deemed to be a civil pro-
ceeding, thereby alleviating any necessity to ensure that the indi-
vidual receive his constitutionally guaranteed right to remain si-
lent. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument and
reasoned that, despite the label attached to a particular proceed-
ing, one must look to the substantive effect of the proceeding. In
effect, the right to remain silent should be secured to a juvenile
in a proceeding which could lead to his indefinite incarceration.
The reasoning of the Court in Specht and Gault has recently
been applied to the area of involuntary commitment of persons
not accused or convicted of crimes because of the possibility that
such a civil proceeding will result in substantial incarceration. In
Heryford v. Parker,5" the court found that the petitioner's com-
mitment to a state school for the feeble-minded and epileptic was
constitutionally defective because he was deprived of his right to
counsel at the commitment hearing. The court eschewed the
civil-criminal distinction and determined that the likelihood of
involuntary incarceration should command the observance of
constitutional safeguards.
5 2
In striking down the Wisconsin emergency commitment stat-
ute 3 as unconstitutional, a federal district court in Lessard v.
50. 386 U.S. at 610.
51. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
52. Id. at 396.
53. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.02-.04 (1957). The Wisconsin involuntary commitment
statute was enacted for the protection of persons and property, allowing temporary, invol-
untary detention for a possible 145 days upon an application executed by a licensed
physician and two other persons. The application described the prospective patient's
1974]
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Schmidt" indicated definite concern over the summary incarcer-
ation of individuals without any requirement for immediate ar-
raignment and neutral determination of probable cause for deten-
tion. The court suggested that in formulating a new emergency
commitment procedure, a forty-eight hour maximum be estab-
lished within which the temporarily detained individual must be
apprised of the situation and a magisterial determination of the
necessity for continued incarceration must be rendered.5 In addi-
tion, the court held that after a determination has been made to
continue incarceration the individual should be afforded a speedy
hearing to determine the issue of mental illness. Prior to the
hearing, timely notice and a clear and particular statement of the
basis for detention must be provided.5 Furthermore, all psychiat-
ric reports and other information which will be introduced at the
hearing must be made available to the patient's counsel.57 The
constitutional guidelines set forth in the Lessard opinion seem to
open the door to a greater expansion of the rights of those individ-
uals subject to incarcerations from a "civil" involuntary commit-
ment proceeding.
The foregoing has delineated the direction some courts have
taken in considering the question of whether the procedural safe-
guards guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to persons accused of
crimes should be extended to mental patients. In the pending
Alexander case, the South Carolina federal district court could
follow this lead and declare the two-physician certification com-
mitment procedure unconstitutional on due process grounds;
illness and set forth reasons why the patient was to be considered irresponsible and
dangerous. The statute permitted confinement without a hearing or without meaningful
notice. It also allowed the court to dispense with notice altogether in cases where notice
was deemed injurious or not advantageous to the person detained.
54. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). In Lessard, the plaintiff was picked up in
front of her residence by two police officers and taken to a mental health center where
she was committed for emergency mental observation. The policemen applied for an
additional observation period of ten days in an ex parte hearing. Subsequently, a physi-
cian filed an application recommending permanent commitment because the plaintiff was
suffering from schizophrenia. The court appointed two doctors as examiners. Eight days
after her initial confinement, plaintiff was informed of the prior proceedings as well as the
scheduled hearing. Twenty-four days later, plaintiff was found to be "mentally ill" by the
court and ordered committed for thirty additional days. Each month for eleven months
after the initial hearing, the thirty day commitment was perfunctorily extended for an
additional month. The hospital authorities allowed the plaintiff to return to her home on
an out-patient, "parole" basis three days after the hearing.
55. Id. at 1090.
56. Id. at 1092.
57. Id. at 1099.
[Vol. 25
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however, it seems that another ground remains equally viable,
that of equal protection.
In the recent decision of Jackson v. Indiana,5" the Supreme
Court concluded that the fact an individual undergoing a civil
commitment proceeding is a prisoner does not provide a rational
basis for denying him the same procedural safeguards afforded
non-criminals in similar civil commitment hearings. As was
pointed out previously, the current South Carolina non-
emergency commitment statutes fail to establish any basis for
determining whether the summary physician-certificate proce-
dure or the judicial admission procedure is to be initiated."5 In
light of the principle in Jackson v. Indiana, allowing commitment
based solely on the application of a friend and certificates of two
physicians, while providing other individuals a judicial hearing
prior to civil commitment, could be constitutionally defective on
equal protection grounds. The pending Alexander case could
adopt this position.
In light of these recent decisions, there seem to be serious
constitutional problems with respect to the validity of the exist-
ing South Carolina procedures for commitment of mentally ill
persons. If the federal district court in Alexander follows the lead
of Lessard and Heryford, redrafting of the involuntary commit-
ment procedures will be necessary to comply with the require-
ments of due process. Similarly the Supreme Court's mandate in
Jackson v. Indiana seems to require a reevaluation of the two
non-emergency commitment procedures.
C. Proposed Legislation
Although the South Carolina federal district court has not
yet heard the Alexander case, the pending litigation seems to
have provided some impetus for the South Carolina Legislature
to draft a substantial revision of the involuntary commitment
statutes."0 The bill is expected to be reintroduced into the General
Assembly for consideration at the beginning of the 1974 term.
This legislative response to a class action challenging the present
statutory procedures is not without recent precedent in the men-
tal health field. In Anderson v. Solomon, ' the court, in refusing
58. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
59. See p. 771 supra.
60. See The State (Columbia, S.C.), April 8, 1973, at B-1, col. 3.
61. 315 F. Supp. 1192 (W.D. Md. 1970). In Anderson, plaintiff brought a class action
1974] 775
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to grant a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action, recognized that substantial questions were raised
as to the constitutionality of the Maryland commitment proce-
dures. This prompted the state health authorities to take a hard
look at the commitment procedures, resulting in a three-year
study by a joint committee of health officials and Legal Aid Bu-
reau lawyers and the drafting of a new set of regulations." The
revision of the Maryland Mental Hygiene Regulations went into
effect October 1, 1973.13
The remainder of this portion of the paper will consider the
proposed non-emergency and emergency commitment procedures
in light of changes in similar procedures in other states. This
comparison is offered with an eye to suggesting some additional
innovations to the current draft of the proposed South Carolina
statute.
The proposed South Carolina commitment procedures re-
flect substantive changes in three areas: (1) providing additional
procedural safeguards prior to commitment; (2) imposing an af-
firmative duty on mental hospitals to inform patients of their
right to request release; and (3) affording patients reasonable
access to the exercise of their rights. Each of these innovations
seems aimed at affording individuals adjudicated mentally ill the
basic rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
1. Non-Emergency Commitment
By far one of the most sweeping changes in non-emergency
admissions under the proposed statute seems to be the elimina-
tion of commitment by the two-physician certificate procedure.
for all persons who were or had recently been in state mental institutions. She alleged that
the old Maryland involuntary commitment procedures were unconstitutional, that past
records of confinement made future commitment more likely and that similar procedural
infirmities were in the newer Maryland statute. The officials of the Department of Mental
Health moved to dismiss the suit. The court, however, concluded that while state judicial
or administrative interpretation could eliminate many of the constitutional issues, some
might remain. The court directed plaintiff to file an amended complaint within fifteen
days, alleging her complaints under the new statute. The court thereby reserved its right
to decide constitutional issues pending consideration of the amended complaint and an-
swer.
62. Knudson, Patients Rights Law is Signed, Baltimore Evening Sun, July 26, 1973,
at D-8, col. 1.
63. MARYLAND STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, § 10.04.03,
REGULATIONS GOVERNING INVOLUNTARY ADMISSION TO MENTAL HEALTH FAcILrrIES UNDER THE
JunISnICIoN OF AND/OR LIcENSED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE,
amended June 12, 1973, effective October 1, 1973.
776 [Vol. 25
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The current non-emergency procedures, which provide for both
judicial admission with its procedural safeguards and the sum-
mary two-physician certificate procedure without any guidelines
to determine when each method should be used, raise possible
equal protection problems. 4 The proposed legislation, however,
wisely eliminates this summary procedure; thus everyone com-
mitted under civil non-emergency procedures will receive a hear-
ing by a probate judge prior to commitment.
In addition to eliminating the summary two-physician certif-
icate procedure, the considerable revisions in the proposed legis-
lation have definitely strengthened the judicial admission proce-
dure. At the outset, the petition filed to initiate the proceeding
must comply with the current requirement that it state the pa-
tient is mentally ill and should be hospitalized. Also, it must give
the underlying facts upon which the designated examiner, or the
petitioner if the individual has refused to submit to an examina-
tion, bases his conclusions.65
Similarly the notice provision of the judicial admission pro-
cedure has been substantially changed.66 Under the existing stat-
ute the court is allowed to withhold notice of the commitment
proceeding from the prospective patient if the court has reason
to believe that such notice would be likely to be injurious to him. 7
Under the proposed statute, however, no such withholding of no-
tice from the prospective patient will be permitted.68 It seems the
drafters concluded that the value of the prospective patient's
receiving notification of the hearing outweighed the interest of the
court in determining whether notification might be injurious to
the prospective patient.
As pointed out, under the current statute the court must
order an examination of the prospective patient by two desig-
nated physicians.69 The proposed legislation would require that
an adequate record of the physicians' examination be supplied to
the prospective patient's attorney to afford the patient meaning-
64. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
65. No. S.539, A Bill Relating to the Commitment, Admission and Discharge of
Persons From Mental Institutions, § 3 (1973). [Hereinafter S.539; also, all references to
changes in Article 4 of Chapter 4 of Title 32 of the 1962 Code will use the section numbers
as they appear in S.539.]
66. Id. § 32-960.
67. S.C. Con ANN. § 32-959 (1962).
68. Id. § 32-960.
69. S.539, § 32-961.
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ful representation. 70 Furthermore, the drafters of the proposed
legislation have made provision for the prospective patient to be
examined by a physician of his choice, rather than one appointed
by the court.7 To prevent any due process or equal protection
attacks, this opportunity is also afforded the indigent at the
state's expense.
72
The court-ordered examination raises a serious problem with
which both the present statute and the proposed draft failed to
deal: whether evidence of criminal activity uncovered during a
court-ordered psychiatric examination is privileged information
under the fifth amendment. Several courts have considered this
problem and have determined that such information should be
privileged.73 The comments to an earlier draft of the proposed
statute, not introduced as part of the bill,74 suggested that unless
the individual gave a competent waiver, information of criminal
activity that he might have revealed could not be used against
him in a later trial. The considerable increase in the use of the
judicial admission procedure as contemplated by the proposed
legislation would seem to warrant the inclusion of such a provi-
sion in this draft to preclude any subsequent controversy over the
disclosure of possibly privileged information.
70. Id. The statute is unclear as to who chooses this independent examiner: the
patient, his attorney, a friend or relation.
71. Id.
72. Since no public interest in any particular patient's well-being exists comparable
to society's interest in the courts and justice, no physician-patient privilege exists at
common law in South Carolina. This would indicate that disclosure by a patient to a
psychiatrist is not privileged under the rules of evidence.
73. See United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1969). In Weiser, the defendant
was convicted of bribing fellow Internal Revenue Service agents. At trial the defendant
raised mental incapacity as a defense, and the court ordered that he be examined by the
government's psychiatric expert who was later allowed to testify as to his professional
opinion concerning the accused's mental capacity. When defense counsel revealed that
mental incapacity would be raised as a defense, the court held on appeal that it was not
a violation of the right against self-incrimination to permit a government psychiatrist, who
did not testify to any statement of the defendant relating to guilt or innocence, to testify
concerning the sanity of the defendant. See also United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719
(4th Cir. 1968). (The privilege against self-incrimination was held not to be violated by
introducing into evidence statements made to a government psychiatrist which were not
related to guilt.) See also Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970). (A person charged
with murder served notice that she would rely on insanity as a defense. The court held
that her right to freedom from self-incrimination was not invaded when she was ordered
"to give testimonial response to a court-appointed psychiatrist under pain of forfeiting the
testimony of her privately-engaged psychiatrist." Id. at 822. However, the psychiatrists
were precluded from testifying directly as to facts surrounding the crime or as to admis-
sions elicited during the course of the compulsory mental examination.)
74. S.539, Comments (tent. draft 1973).
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The foregoing comparison of the present commitment statute
with the proposed legislation has pointed out some pre-hearing
procedural reformation. Similarly the proposed statute offers
some needed changes in the procedure of the commitment hear-
ing. As indicated in the earlier discussion of the current code, a
judicial hearing is necessitated only upon two physicians' pron-
ouncements that the patient is mentally ill." Likewise, this same
basis is used under the proposed code in determining if a judicial
hearing is required. 6 Unlike the current code 7 however, the pro-
posed draft requires that the prospective patient attend the hear-
ing unless the patient or his attorney waives the right to appear.
7
1
Furthermore, in the current code the court is permitted to receive
all relevant and material evidence offered at the hearing,7 9 seem-
ingly allowing the possibility of introducing hearsay. 0 To prevent
this use of hearsay, the proposed legislation specifically pre-
scribes that the probate court's rules of evidence be applicable in
these commitment proceedings. 8' By including these proposed
changes, the drafters seem to have recognized the very real injus-
tices that might result from not having the prospective patient
present at the time the question of his freedom is being deter-
mined, and by allowing evidence to be introduced at a commit-
ment hearing that would not be properly submitted at a trial
where an accused's freedom is similarly at stake.
Although the current statute allows appeal to the circuit
court from the commitment order of the probate court,8 2 the ap-
peal provision fails to take notice of the fact that unless a patient
has ready access to a transcript of the proceeding the right to
appeal is meaningless. In effect, if one cannot afford a transcript,
then he would seemingly be denied his right of appeal. This prob-
lem has not been raised previously because the judicial admission
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-961 (1962). See p. 769 supra.
76. S.539, § 32-955.
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-962 (1962).
78. S.539, § 32-964.
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-960 (1962). Section 10.04.03G of the Maryland Regulations
provides a more informal admission of "[elvidence which possesses probative value com-
monly accepted by reasonable and prudent men in the conduct of their affairs." The
regulation allows the introduction as evidence of copies and excerpts of documents and
specifically states that the formal rules of evidence of the Maryland courts will not be
applied.
80. See note 33 supra.
81. S.539, § 32-964.
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-967 (1962).
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process was so seldom used.83 However, in contemplation of the
inevitable increase in the usage of the judicial admission proce-
dure under the proposed code as a result of the elimination of the
two-physician certification procedure, the drafters had to con-
sider this problem." The proposed statute provides the indigent
patient the right to a free transcript. 5 This provision seems to
preempt an equal protection problem which might arise from
denying a patient an effective and meaningful right to appeal
from the order of commitment.
To achieve a meaningful evaluation of the new procedure,
one must turn from the examination of the innovative features of
the proposed judicial admission procedure to some of the areas
that the drafters have overlooked. Three areas deserve attention:
(1) the quantum of proof for a determination of mental illness;
(2) the length of the commitment period; and (3) consideration
of less restrictive alternatives than confinement to a mental
hospital.
Although the current statute fails to provide the court with
any standard for the quantum of proof necessary for a determina-
tion of mental illness, 8 the drafters of the proposed judicial ad-
mission procedure advocate the adoption of the "clear and con-
vincing" evidence standard .8 Although some recent decisions
concluded that the standard should be a preponderance of the
evidence,88 the courts in Lessard v. Schmidt 9 and Denton v.
Commonwealth"0 concluded that the better standard for commit-
ment should be "beyond a reasonable doubt." In reaching this
determination, the court in Lessard reasoned that the same fun-
damental liberties are at stake in civil commitment as are in-
volved in criminal incarceration.' Although the provision for the
"clear and convincing" standard in the proposed code indicates
83. See p. 771 supra.
84. In Maryland, a mechanical recording of the hearing is provided, with a transcript
to be made if an appeal is taken. MD. REG. § 10.04.03G. This less expensive procedure
could also be used in South Carolina without a change in the proposed statute and without
infringing upon the right of appeal.
85. S.539, § 32-964.
86. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-963 (1962).
87. S.539, § 32-965.
88. See Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971); Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d
506 (4th Cir. 1964); Dixon v. Att'y. Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
89. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
90. 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
91. Lessard v. Schmidt, 345 F. Supp. at 1084.
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an awareness of the need for some standard, one cannot easily
disregard the rationale on which the court in Lessard prescribed
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Perhaps a reevalua-
tion of the proposed standard would be desirable, as there seems
to be a growing tendency by the courts to analogize the civil
commitment procedure to that of criminal confinement.1
2
Under both the current 3 and proposed statutes,94 the dura-
tion of judicial commitment is indefinite. In Dixon v. Attorney
General,"5 the court felt that if commitment is ordered the writ
should specifically state the period of confinement, not to exceed
six months. Although the commitment order under the proposed
procedure does not specify a confinement period, the provision in
the proposed code that requires the patient to receive written
notification of his right to a rehearing at the end of each six-
month period of confinement might mollify challenge to this defi-
ciency. 6 This alternative, however, might not cure the indefinite-
ness if in practice the rehearing becomes a fiction and the six-
month notification a mere procedural frill. Then it would seem
that the Maryland solution as prescribed in Dixon would be the
only realistic approach.
Finally, the judicial commitment statute, both under the
present and proposed codes, failed to require the probate court to
consider the possibility of less restrictive alternatives than con-
finement to a mental hospital. In both the Lessard" and Dixon"
opinions, the courts seemed to imply that such consideration
should be accorded the individual after he has been adjudicated
mentally ill, but prior to any confinement, because involuntary
92. See p. 772 supra.
93. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 32-963 (1962).
94. See S.539, § 32-965.
95. 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971). In Dixon, several patients brought a class
action to have Pennsylvania's mental health law declared unconstitutional. After the
original authority for their confinement for criminal convictions or charges had termi-
nated, plaintiffs were recommitted for an indeterminable period without notice or proce-
dural safeguards.
96. S.539, § 32-968.
97. The Lessard court opined that, even though the governmental purpose of confine-
ment may be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the same end can be more narrowly achieved.
98. The court in Dixon was prompted by its conclusion that medical and psychiatric
treatment of inmates at the state hospital was grossly inadequate because insufficient
funds had been made available for the hospital's maintenance and staffing. Evidence
indicated that only three percent of the hospital's inhabitants had received any therapeu-
tic treatment.
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hospitalization should only be ordered as a last resort. This con-
clusion was premised on the idea that even though persons are
adjudged mentally ill, but not alleged to have committed any
crime, they should not be "[tiotally deprived of their liberty if
there are less drastic means of achieving the same purpose."99
Likewise, in Covington v. Harris, I'0 the court determined that not
only was consideration of an alternative to commitment desirable
but that it was constitutionally required. Similarly the spirit of
the California Code'0' seems to adopt the idea that the mentally
ill should receive the least restrictive method of treatment avail-
able. To that end, the statute requires the appointment of a con-
servator,'02 who must choose the best treatment for a particular
individual adjudged mentally ill. Also, California provides for an
extensive system of outpatient facilities' 3 which seem to be fi-
nancially beyond the reach of the current South Carolina mental
health program. 0 To encourage the development of such alterna-
tives to confinement in mental hospitals in South Carolina, it is
suggested that the proposed statute be amended to provide that
99. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1095.
100. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Soon after his release from prison, defendant was
again charged with murder; however, he was found incompetent to stand trial because of
a mental deficiency coupled with psychological problems. He was civilly committed to a
maximum security hospital, and the pending murder charge was dismissed. When his
request for transfer out of the maximum security division was denied, he sought relief with
a habeas corpus petition. In remanding the case to cure deficiencies in the record, the
court indicated that the very nature of civil commitment entails an extraordinary depriva-
tion of liberty. Such a drastic curtailment of fundamental rights must be narrowly con-
strued to avoid deprivations of liberty without due process of law.
101. CAL. WELF. & INSTs. CODE §§ 5200 et seq. (West 1973). The California Code
provides for an evaluation consisting of multidisciplinary professional analysis of a pro-
spective patient. Medical, psychological, social, financial and legal conditions are exam-
ined to determine the extent and ramifications of the individual's problems. In all cases
of petitions for court-ordered evaluation, pre-petition screening is required and, if indi-
cated, comprehensive evaluation, crisis intervention, referral, or other services may be
recommended on a voluntary basis. See p. 785 infra for additional discussion.
102. CAL. WELF. & INsTs. COD § 5206 (West 1973). The appointment of a conservator
results from recommendations in the report of a conservatorship investigation. The inves-
tigations are conducted by an agency appointed by the court. If investigation results in a
recommendation for conservatorship, a suitable person, state or local agency, or county
officer or employee must be designated to act as conservator. No person or agency whose
interests compromise the ability to represent and safeguard the interests of the conserva-
tee may be designated as conservator.
103. See p. 786 infra.
104. Stucker, S.C. Hospitals Work on 'Major Deficiencies,' The State (Columbia,
S.C.), October 25, 1973, at 10-C, col. 1. This article points out that the Mental Health
Commission has requested a thirty-four percent increase in personnel for 1974-75 at an
additional cost of 7.5 million.
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after a person has been determined to be mentally ill and to need
treatment, he be ordered confined to a state mental hospital or
given treatment under some less restrictive program.
2. Emergency Commitment
Under both the proposed legislation and the current statute,
emergency commitment can be initiated on the written applica-
tion of anyone, accompanied by one physician's certification that
the results of his examination revealed the individual to be both
mentally ill and dangerous."'5 Also, if a person is believed to be
mentally ill but cannot be examined by a physician prior to com-
mitment because his whereabouts are unknown or for any other
reason, the proposed emergency commitment statute provides for
arrest and post-arrest examination."6
By definition only those persons who are or are believed to
be mentally ill and dangerous are subject to emergency commit-
ment. As indicated in the proposed legislation, all others sought
to be confined must be committed under the procedures estab-
lished by judicial admission. This seems to present a problem for
one group of persons, those who are gravely disabled as the result
of a mental disorder and as such are really unable to provide for
basic personal needs such as food, clothing and shelter. These
individuals usually are in need of immediate commitment which
cannot be obtained under the judicial admission process because
of the substantial time lapse between commencement of the pro-
ceedings and actual admission of the patient to the hospital.
California, for example, has realized the exigency of the circum-
stances in this type of case and accordingly has made provision
for possible immediate commitment if the situation warrants. 07
Similarly it is suggested that the drafters of the proposed South
Carolina legislation might consider the possibility of extending
the coverage of emergency commitment to include this type of
gravely disabled individual.
The drafters of the proposed emergency commitment statute
have also added some innovations. After a person is taken into
custody under the proposed emergency procedure, a preliminary
105. S.539, § 32-955.
106. Id. § 32-957. This provision incorporates the arrest and examination procedure
of the two-physician admission procedure in § 32-955.1 of the South Carolina Code, which
would be deleted under the proposed code.
107. CAL. WELF. & INSTS. CODE § 5202 (West 1973).
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hearing at which the patient must be represented by counsel
must be held within three to five calendar days."8 Although it has
been held that a longer period of time may elapse before a prelim-
inary hearing after emergency commitment,"9 it is submitted
that a forty-eight hour period would give sufficient time for the
appointment and preliminary preparation of counsel and would
assure that an individual would not be unjustly detained for a
longer period than absolutely necessary.
If at the preliminary hearing the court determines there is
probable cause to believe that the patient is mentally ill and
dangerous, the patient will continue to be detained at the hospi-
tal."0 After this preliminary determination of mental illness, a
hearing must be held pursuant to the judicial admission hearing
procedure."' At this juncture in the proposed emergency provi-
sions, the procedure and requirements of the judicial admission
process are interposed,' thereby providing all prospective pa-
tients with the same procedural and substantive rights at the
commitment hearing and on appeal as in judicial admission. In
so doing, it appears the drafters failed to include portions of the
judicial admission process preceding the provisions for the actual
hearing. Initiation of emergency commitment only requires one
physician to certify that an individual is mentally ill and danger-
ous. Unlike the judicial admission process which requires two
designated physicians to examine the patient prior to the hearing,
the proposed emergency procedure fails to require an examina-
tion by two court-appointed examiners prior to the commitment
hearing. Furthermore, the drafters failed to provide for the right
to request an examination by an independent examiner as is per-
mitted under the judicial admission process."' This omission
means that the patient could be committed by the probate court
108. S.539, § 32-955(3).
109. Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1972), stated that under emer-
gency admission procedures a fifteen day period was not an unreasonable time to hold a
patient without a hearing. But see In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The court
upheld a statute allowing a seven-day detention period for emergency commitment but
argued that an initial hearing should, whenever possible, be held within the first two days
of such period.
110. S.539, § 32-955(3).
111. Id. § 32-956. At the preliminary hearing, the proposed patient must be present
and represented by counsel, either retained or appointed by the court if he is indigent,
and adequate notice requirements must also be met.
112. See S.539, § 32-955(3).
113, Id. § 32-961.
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without ever having been examined by anyone except the one
physician who signed the emergency commitment certificate be-
fore initial confinement."'
The foregoing has been an examination of the proposed emer-
gency procedure to be followed when the patient has been exam-
ined prior to the initial confinement. The emergency procedure
also encompasses the situation where the individual is only be-
lieved mentally ill and dangerous and is unavailable for examina-
tion because his whereabouts are unknown or for some other rea-
son.115 To initiate emergency confinement in this instance, the
petitioner seeking commitment of an individual must file an affi-
davit.' 6 On the basis of this affidavit, the probate judge may
order that the individual be taken into custody for twenty-four
hours during which the patient must be examined by one physi-
cian.' The individual confined under this procedure does have
the right to representation by counsel."'
In this phase of emergency commitment there seem to be
some serious possibilities for abuse: a system that allows one
individual's affidavit to serve as the sole basis for emergency
incarceration of another seems ripe for frivolous and perhaps col-
lusive manipulation. California has responded to this problem by
providing for a "screening process" of emergency applications.
Before any arrest and detention is authorized county officials
determine whether there is probable cause to believe the allega-
tions in the affidavit and, more importantly, whether the individ-
ual will agree to receive "crisis intervention services" or an exami-
nation in his home or an approved facility."' This "pre-petition
screening" consists of a professional review of all petitions, "[a]n
interview with the petitioner and, whenever possible, the person
alleged, as a result of mental disorder, to be a danger to others or
to himself, or to be gravely disabled, to assess the problem and
114. It seems clear that the failure to provide for examination by designated examin-
ers is an oversight. S.539, § 32-956, which deals with notice of a hearing for those detained
under emergency commitment, states that the patient has the right to request the names
of the designated examiners who may testify against him. This seems to assume that an
examination by designated examiners has been provided; however, it seems it has not.
115. S.539, § 32-957.
116. Id. The affidavit must state why the person is believed to be mentally ill and
dangerous and why the usual procedure cannot be followed.
117. Id. After examination and certification by one physician, the commitment con-
tinues under regular emergency commitment procedure. S.539, § 32-955(3).
118. Id.
119. CAL. WELF. & INSTS. CODE §§ 5000 et seq. (West 1972).
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explain the petition ... ."I" As defined by the California code,
'crisis intervention' consists of an interview or series of inter-
views within a brief period of time, conducted by qualified pro-
fessionals, and designed to alleviate personal or family situa-
tions which present a serious and imminent threat to the health
or stability of the person or family, or on an inpatient or outpa-
tient basis with such therapy, or other services, as may be ap-
propriate. Crisis intervention may, as appropriate, include sui-
cide prevention, psychiatric, welfare, psychological, legal, or
other social services; . . ..
The financial situation of the current mental health program in
South Carolina would preclude such an extensive pre-commit-
ment screening process.2 2 However, it is submitted that amend-
ing the proposed draft to require that the petitioner not only file
a written application for another's emergency commitment with-
out examination but also appear before the probate judge to jus-
tify such application would tend to discourage frivolous use of the
procedure.
A final observation with respect to emergency commitment
is that both the existing and proposed statutes fail to make any
provision for the protection of privacy. This means that if a per-
son committed under emergency procedures is found, either be-
fore or after the hearing, not mentally ill he nevertheless has a
record of having been a mental patient. This record may injure
him in the future far more than any deprivations of liberty which
he experienced while temporarily confined. The Maryland invol-
untary admission regulations have dealt with this problem by
designating an "observation period," the interval between initial
confinement to a mental health facility and commitment after a
hearing or discharge from the mental health facility.ln For the
duration of this period the patient's records are not integrated
with or made part of the ordinary patient records of the facility.
Only when the patient is admitted after a full hearing do they
become a part of the official records. If he is not admitted, the
"observation records" will not be disclosed to anyone without the
permission of the patient, except upon summons or subpoena.'24
120. Id. § 5008(0.
121. Id. § 5008(e).
122. See note 36 supra.
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It should be pointed out, however, that a provision such as this
is far more adaptable to the Maryland experience than the South
Carolina situation. In Maryland, the hearing before admission is
an administrative function '25 allowing the patient's entire record
to be maintained in the mental health department, whereas in
South Carolina the hearing is a judicial function. Nevertheless,
a similar result would ensue if a provision were added to the
proposed code providing for maintenance of separate hospital re-
cords from the time of admission until the actual commitment
hearing. Further, if the prospective patient were not found to be
mentally ill the record of such hearing, together with all prelimi-
nary records, should be sealed or destroyed by order of the pro-
bate judge.
H. COMMITMENT OF PERSONS ACCUSED OR CONVICTED OF CRIME
A. Introduction
Traditionally in this country there has been an attempt to
categorize commitments as either "civil" or "criminal." This ar-
ticle has dealt thus far with "civil" commitment procedures. It
now turns to a discussion of the process used for the commitment
to mental institutions of those persons charged with or convicted
of crime. Denoting commitments as "criminal" or "civil" does
not necessarily indicate the legal nature of the proceedings in-
volved. Both types of commitment proceedings are essentially
civil, but the distinction between the two lies in the circumstan-
ces surrounding the commitment. Criminal commitment applies
to the commitment of persons charged with or convicted of crime
while civil commitment pertains to the admission of all other
persons to mental institutions. As will be discussed, separate
commitment procedures do not seem to be constitutionally per-
missible. The general feeling that those who violate society's
criminal laws are somehow different and require segregation from
the community seems to carry over into the area of mental health,
resulting in a separate procedure for criminal commitment. Per-
haps notions that the commission of crime is itself a display of
mental illness and that mentally diseased persons who are con-
nected with criminal activity are more dangerous than their non-
125. The Maryland regulations apply to every patient whose involuntary admission
is sought to be effected to any mental facility, licensed or subject to jurisdiction of the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.
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criminal peers are partly responsible for a history of separate
commitment procedures.'28
Regardless of the underlying reasons for separate treatment,
criminal commitment has been handled differently from its civil
counterpart, and the present law regarding such commitment
must be discussed with this in mind. One should also be aware
that criminal commitments can be subdivided into three catego-
ries. The first is commitment for incompetency or unfitness to
stand trial. "Competency to stand trial" refers to a person's fit-
ness or mental condition at the time of the trial. A second type
of commitment concerns instances in which the defense of insan-
ity is used. The focus in this area is on criminal responsibility,
the mental condition of the accused at the time the offense was
committed. A third class of criminal commitment involves pris-
oners who have become mentally ill subsequent to their incarcer-
ation.
B. Present South Carolina Law
The traditional approach is followed in South Carolina in
that the procedures in civil and criminal commitments are dis-
tinct.127 A person charged with a crime can be admitted to a state
hospital for thirty days by court order if he is adjudged mentally
ill or if there is a question as to the relationship of mental illness
to the alleged crime.' 28 If found competent, the individual is re-
leased to stand trial; however, if found incompetent, the superin-
tendent of the state hospital will certify his incompetency and
retain the accused, subject to further orders of the court.12 The
present statute does not provide a hearing or other due process
safeguards which would allow the person detained to effectively
challenge a finding of incompetency. Unlike the provisions for
review of the civil commitment decisions, criminal commitment
proceedings do not provide for review of the determination of
competency made by the hospital authorities, nor do they estab-
lish the right to a de novo jury trial on appeal.1
30
Once an accused is found to be incompetent to stand trial,
126. For a general discussion of crime and its relationship to mental illness see T.
SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963).
127. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-969 to -970 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
128. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-969 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
129. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-970 (Cur. Supp. 1971).
130. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-967 (1962).
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the statute authorizing his retention by hospital authorities
leaves the defendant's future open to question. Specifically, the
present law provides for the holding of one found mentally incom-
petent "subject to the further orders of the court."' 31 No indica-
tion is given as to when, if ever, such an order is required to be
issued, except if the person confined is at some future date
deemed to have regained competency by hospital authorities, it
shall be reported to the court. The court is then required to advise
the hospital as to the further disposition of the patient. By omit-
ting any requirement for further disposition (except when the
defendant regains competency), the statute certainly implies that
a person may be confined for life in a state hospital without ever
having a hearing or formal judicial commitment.
The second type of criminal commitment has not played as
significant a role in South Carolina as it has in other jurisdictions.
In South Carolina there are no provisions for commitment of
persons lacking criminal responsibility at the time the offense was
committed. In fact, there is no verdict of "not guilty by reason of
insanity" in South Carolina. 32 Insanity 33 is a complete defense
whereby a defendant who can prove that he was insane at the
time of the offense is entitled to a verdict of acquittal. A finding
of acquittal, however, does not completely release the defendant
from possible commitment. Contrary to some jurisdictions, South
Carolina has no provision for compulsory commitment of defen-
dants who successfully rely on the insanity defense. The defen-
dant may, nevertheless, be committed at the trial judge's discre-
tion under the provisions applicable to persons found incompe-
tent to stand trial. '34 The present code states that "any person"
charged with the commission of a criminal offense who is ad-
judged to be mentally ill or "regarding whom there is a question
as to the relation of mental illness to the alleged crime" may be
committed to a state hospital by the court. 13' If found "mentally
ill," an individual may be detained, "subject to the further orders
131. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-970 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
132. W. LEDBETER & W. MYERS, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 139 (1970).
133. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-969 (Cum. Supp. 1971). The only test for legal insanity in
South Carolina is the M'Naughten Rule, frequently referred to as the "right-wrong test."
State v. Allen, 231 S.C. 391, 98 S.E.2d 826 (1957); State v. Byrd, 229 S.C. 593, 93 S.E.2d
900 (1956); State v. Fuller, 229 S.C. 439, 93 S.E.2d 463 (1956). The "irresistible impulse
test," used in many states in connection with M'Naughten, has been rejected in South
Carolina. State v. Allen, 231 S.C. 391, 98 S.E.2d 826 (1957).
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of the court."' 36 Apparently, under the pertinent sections a judge
at his discretion may commit a person after acquittal since even
one acquitted might come under the statute.
The remaining discussion of the present criminal commit-
ment provisions involves the commitment of persons who are
incarcerated in penal institutions and who, for whatever reasons,
require confinement in a state hospital. The South Carolina Code
does not deal separately with such commitments except in cases
in which the length of commitment exceeds the prisoner's sent-
ence.'37 If judicially committed, one confined to a facility oper-
ated by the Department of Mental Health, but located within the
State Penitentiary,1 31 may be required to remain there or in an-
other mental health facility after the completion of his sent-
ence.'3 5 The judicial commitment proceeding is initiated on com-
pletion of the sentence, and the person remains confined not to
exceed a maximum of sixty days pending the court's determina-
tion.'40 If judicially committed as mentally ill and a potential
danger to himself or others, one can be indefinitely continued in
the Department of Mental Health's penitentiary facility if the
136. S.C. CODa ANN. § 32-970 (Cum. Supp. 1971); see 18 S.C.L. REV. 661, 666 (1966).
137. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-970 (Cum. Supp. 1971). There is no mention in the S.C.
Code of any statutory regulations concerning the transfer of an inmate from the general
prison population to the state hospital. It is our understanding through informal inquiry
that there is an agreement between the Department of Corrections and the Department
of Mental Health whereby the Commissioner of Mental Health authorizes transfers of
inmates on request of Department of Corrections officials. Such a transfer to a mental
health facility either inside or outside the walls of the State Penitentiary is apparently
made without any formal commitment proceeding or opportunity for the inmate to contest
the transfer. Of course, the inmate must be judicially committed if his sentence expires.
Until the inmate's sentence expires or until the authorities involved decide to transfer him
back to the general prison population, he is simply considered to be serving his sentence
on loan to the Department of Mental Health. It might also be mentioned that certain
mentally deficient inmates are housed in a separate area designated Cell Block 2 (CB-2)
at the State Penitentiary. This area is apparently not designated officially as a Depart-
ment of Mental Health facility although certain mental health services are provided to
those inmates, Once an inmate is transferred into the Department of Mental Health, the
Commissioner is authorized to move him to various facilities within the system consistent
with the medical needs of the patient. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-995.13 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
138. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-933 (Cum. Supp. 1971). This section provides for the
designation of any building or portion of any building at the State Penitentiary as a
facility of the Department of Mental Health. Such a facility is under the control of the
Department of Mental Health for medical and psychiatric services, but responsibility for
maintenance and security lies primarily with the Department of Corrections.
139. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-970.1 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
140. Judicial commitment must be accomplished in accordance with the procedures
provided by § 32-958 of the South Carolina Code.
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Department so chooses.'4 At first glance, it might seem that a
person held in the penitentiary pending judicial commitment
could be housed there only if the Department of Mental Health
lacked adequate security facilities. However, a careful reading of
the present statute reveals that a lack of adequate facilities must
be shown only if a "person . . . charged with a crime" is being
held at the penitentiary.4 2 There is no indication that such a
showing must be made for persons continued at the penitentiary
upon the termination of their sentence. After serving his sent-
ence, the ex-offender would not fit this category, and it therefore
appears that he could be forced to remain in the Mental Health
unit at the prison without a showing that adequate security facili-
ties were not available elsewhere.1
3
C. Judicial Reaction To Criminal Commitment
The judicial reaction throughout the country to present crim-
inal commitment law has shown clearly that major revisions are
required before there will be statutory compliance with certain
constitutional protections. As stated previously, the handling of
civil and criminal commitment proceedings differently has in the
past been acceptable.' Recent judicial pronouncements indi-
cate, however, that procedural differences are to be avoided ab-
sent a showing of adequate justification.
Baxstrom v. Herold' is perhaps the leading case which ex-
presses the requirement for procedural similarity. Baxstrom was
a state prisoner in New York who was certified insane by a prison
physician. At the expiration of Baxstrom's regular prison sent-
ence, he was retained in the same facility on an indeterminate
basis instead of being released. This retention was based solely
on the doctor's certification as to his insanity. 6 The Supreme
141. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-970.1 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
142. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-970.2 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
143. The authors are not prepared to state that it is the Department of Mental
Health's routine practice to keep persons at the penitentiary facility because they are ex-
offenders. Our only contention is that §§ 32-970.1-.2 leave open the possibility of such a
practice since the requirement for showing a lack of adequate security facilities is neces-
sary only in regard to persons charged with crime. It seems the Department could house
ex-inmates at the prison after termination of sentence without such a showing and be
within their present statutory authority.
144. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Overholser v. Leash,
257 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
145. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
146. A proceeding was held regarding Baxstrom's continued confinement, but Bax-
19741
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Court held that Baxstrom was denied equal protection of the law
because the procedures normally used for civil commitment were
denied him. 7 The Court stated "[tihat the State, having made
this substantial review proceeding generally available on this
issue [of sanity], may not, consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arbitrarily withhold it
from some."' 4 In the Court's view, even though a person found
to be dangerous might custodially be handled differently once
admitted to a mental institution, there is no legitimate basis for
distinguishing between the procedural trappings provided a per-
son committed at the termination of his prison sentence and a
person civilly committed directly from the community.'
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals relied heavily on
the Baxstrom principle in Bolton v. Harris, "I a decision involving
the commitment of a defendant found "not guilty by reason of
insanity." 15 On rendering the verdict, the court ordered Bolton
to mandatory commitment in a mental institution for an indeter-
minate period of time.'52 The court held that in view of Baxstrom
strom, an indigent, was forced to appear without counsel. After the subsequent dismissal
of several habeas corpus petitions in state court, Baxstrom was able to gain entrance into
federal court by alleging constitutional violations.
147. In 1961 persons civilly committed under § 74 of the New York Mental Hygiene
Law were entitled to a de novo review by jury trial regarding their sanity. Also, persons
civilly committed from the community were afforded a judicial hearing to determine their
dangerousness by § 85 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law, whereas persons awaiting
expiration of sentence were not, as they were, determined to be dangerous by a nonreview-
able decision of the Department of Mental Hygiene.
148. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. at 111 (1966). The state contended in this case
that it was reasonable to differentiate between the civilly insane and the criminally insane
because of the dangerous or criminal propensities of the latter. The Court stated that even
though "[ejqual protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically,
I . . it does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which
the classification is made." Id. at 111.
149. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. at 111.
150. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
151. Gerald Bolton was charged with the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and
transportation of a stolen automobile.
152. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) states in pertinent part:
If any person tried. . . for an offense. . . is acquitted solely on the ground that
he was insane at the time of its commission, the court shall order such person
to be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill.
The annotation to this section states that the purpose of the mandatory, confinement
required by § 24-301(d) was the "direct result of the change in the standard of criminal
responsibility in the District of Columbia wrought by the Durham case." D.C. ENCY. ANN.
§ 24-301(d)(19). As a result of Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
Congress changed commitment from a discretionary decision of the judge to a mandatory
commitment whenever a person was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Though the
28
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and the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act,' "prior criminal
conduct cannot be deemed a sufficient justification for substan-
tial differences in the procedures and requirements for commit-
ment ... ."I" This holding meant that the same procedural
safeguards provided for civil commitments were required for a
commitment of Bolton after he was adjudicated "not guilty by
reason of insanity." '5 The Court concluded that mandatory com-
mitment differed from "civil" commitment in not requiring a
hearing without which equal protection to those criminally com-
mitted would be denied. The court pointed out, however, that at
least one important difference in the commitment process for
persons found "not guilty by reason of insanity" could be allowed,
that of a "temporary" commitment for examination. The fact
that the jury had determined that a reasonable doubt did exist
as to Bolton's sanity was considered a sufficient basis for confin-
ing the defendant "temporarily" for examination.'55 The length of
time allowed for such an examination must, however, be reasona-
ble.
The decision in Bolton concerned commitment after trial,
without considering the problem of commitment before trial. In
Jackson v. Indiana'5 the Supreme Court held that the Baxstrom
standard applies to pre-trial commitment of incompetent crimi-
nal defendants. The petitioner, Theon Jackson, was a mentally
defective deaf mute who could not read, write, or communicate
except through some limited use of sign language. Charged with
two robberies amounting to nine dollars, he faced confinement for
above annotation is careful to point out that commitment of a person after a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity is not an adjudication of insanity or in competency, Green
v. United States, 351 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and that no penal or punitive intent is
involved, Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960), it seems clear that Bolton
recognized that nomenclature does not change the true substance and effect of such
procedure. Apparently, the statute stands today only to authorize the mandatory commit-
ment of a defendant for a temporary period of examination following his adjudication as
not guilty by reason of insanity. After such examination, a commitment consistent with
Baxstrom must be conducted in order to detain the defendant further.
153. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-501 to -591 (1967).
154. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The Baxstrom principle
forbidding differences in commitment procedures finds support in other cases. People v.
Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966); Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d
193 (D.C. Cir. 1967); and Carroll v. McNeill, 294 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1961), appeal dismissed
as moot, 369 U.S. 149 (1962).
155. Bolton was applied prospectively. For a more recent application see Waite v.
Jacobs, 475 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
156. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d at 651.
157. 92 S. Ct. 1845 (1972).
1974]
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life in a mental institution under the construction of Indiana's
commitment procedures."'5 The trial testimony seemed to indi-
cate little chance of Jackson's condition improving.'59 It seems
very apparent that commitment until sane, pursuant to Indiana
law, would very likely condemn Jackson to confinement for life
in a mental hospital.
The Supreme Court found that the statute under which
Jackson was committed was more lenient on admission and more
severe on release than the comparable statute for involuntary
commitment of feeble-minded persons'60 or for mentally ill per-
sons.'"' This disparity, said the Court, violated the equal protec-
158. Indiana did provide for a competency hearing under INn. CODE § 35-5-3-2 (1971).
This section provides:
When at any time before the trial of any criminal cause or during the progress
thereof and before the final submission of the cause to the court or jury trying
the same, the court, either from his own knowledge or upon the suggestion of
any person, has reasonable ground for believing the defendant to be insane, he
shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine the question of the
defendant's sanity and shall appoint two [2] competent disinterested physi-
cians who shall examine the defendant upon the question of his sanity and
testify concerning the same at the hearing. At the hearing, other evidence may
be introduced to prove the defendant's sanity or insanity. If the court shall find
that the defendant has comprehension sufficient to understand the nature of the
criminal action against him and the proceedings thereon and to make his de-
fense, the trial shall not be delayed or continued on the ground of the alleged
insanity of the defendant. If the court shall find that the defendant has not
comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense,
the trial shall be delayed or continued on the ground of the alleged insanity of
the defendant. If the court shall find that the defendant has not comprehension
sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense, the court shall
order the defendant committed to the department of mental health, to be con-
fined by the department in an appropriate psychiatric institution. Whenever the
defendant shall become sane the superintendent of the state psychiatric hospital
shall certify the fact to the proper court, who shall enter an order on his record
directing the sheriff to return the defendant, or the court may enter such order
in the first instance whenever he shall be sufficiently advised of the defendant's
restoration to sanity. Upon the return to court of any defendant so committed
he or she shall then be placed upon trial for the criminal offense the same as if
no delay or postponement had occurred by reason of defendant's insanity.
159. One physician testified at the competency hearing that "it was extremely un-
likely that petitioner could ever learn to read or write and questioned whether petitioner
even had the ability to develop any proficiency in sign language." He stated that peti-
tioner's "prognosis appears rather dim." The other doctor who examined Jackson doubted
that he would ever develop enough skills in communication to be considered competent.
Additionally, there was testimony that because of the severity of Jackson's condition, the
State of Indiana simply did not have the facilities to~each or train him. Jackson v. Indiana,
92 S. Ct. 1845, 1848 (1972).
160. INn. COD § 16-15-1-3 (1971).
161. IND. CODE §§ 16-13-2-9 to -10, 16-14-9-1 to -19-1, 16-14-14-1 to -19, 16-14-15-1,
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tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. According to the Court,
if in Baxstrom criminal conviction was considered insufficient to
justify fewer procedural safeguards than in civil commitment,
then surely the fact that criminal charges had been filed would
not warrant commitment procedures which differ from those used
for persons not charged.'
62
In McNeil v. Director,"' the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
view that one cannot be indefinitely confined by procedures sub-
stantially different from those used for civil commitment. McNeil
was found guilty of two assaults and sentenced to five years im-
prisonment. Instead of going immediately to prison, however,
McNeil was sent by the court to Patuxent Institution for an ex-
amination and possible commitment as a defective delinquent."4
Six years later, McNeil was still "temporarily" confined for ob-
servation and examination because he refused to answer the ques-
tions posed by the examining officials. The officials claimed that
without his cooperation no evaluation could be made and that as
a result his commitment was temporary, not requiring normal
commitment procedures. The Court stated, however, that proce-
dures designed to authorize temporary observation cannot be
used for confinement which is in fact indefinite. It therefore re-
fused to allow confinement which was truly "permanent" to be
called "temporary."'' 5 For observation periods that are actually
temporary, reduced safeguards were considered permissible,"'
but the Court strongly emphasized that "due process requires
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasona-
ble relation to the purpose for which the individual is commit-
16-14-15-5, 35-5-3-4 (1971).
162. Jackson v. Indiana, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 1851 (1972); accord, Miller v. Blalock, 411
F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Druken, 356 Mass. 503, 254 N.E.2d 779 (1969).
163. 407 U.S. 245 (1972). For an indepth analysis of this case by McNeil's attorney,
E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. of Washington, D.C., see 11 AMi. Cmri. L. REv. 107 (1973).
164. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 6(b) (1971). A defective delinquent is defined as:
an individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated antisocial or
criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who is
found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or
both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to require such
confinement and treatment, when appropriate, as may make it reasonably safe
for society to terminate the confinement and treatment.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 5 (1971).
165. McNeil v. Director, 92 S. Ct. 2083, 2087 (1972).
166. This view is similar to that adopted by the D.C. Circuit in Bolton, regarding
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ted.,,'07
All of the foregoing decisions revolved around the central
theme that commitment procedures, absent adequate justifica-
tion, must be substantially the same for all persons. Though the
constitutionality of different commitment processes has never
been decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, an at-
tempt was made to raise the issue in Schneider v. State."' The
petitioner challenged the provisions for commitment of persons
charged with crimes"' on the grounds that (1) no provision for
review of the State Hospital's decision as to his sanity was al-
lowed; and (2) unlike the provision for civil judicial admission,'
70
no right to a jury trial de novo on appeal was provided. The court
refused to address the constitutional issue, stating that the peti-
tioner failed to allege or try to prove his sanity either at the time
of his initial commitment or at his habeas corpus hearing.'7 ' The
court stated that because the petitioner had failed to allege com-
petency he had not shown that the statute was being applied to
his injury or disadvantage and was therefore in no position to
challenge the constitutionality of the statute.
7 2
In Humphrey v. Cady 3 the Supreme Court expanded
Baxstrom to apply to commitments rendered in lieu of sentenc-
ing. Under the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act 74 Humphrey was com-
167. McNeil v. Director, 92 S. Ct. at 2087.
168. 255 S.C. 594, 180 S.E.2d 340 (1971). For background information see the earlier
decision in Schneider v. State, 250 S.C. 298, 157 S.E.2d 593 (1967).
169. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-969 to -970 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
170. Section 32-967 of the South Carolina Code states:
The petitioner or any interested person standing within the family relationship
of the proposed patient may appeal from the order of the probate court to the
court of common pleas of the county, and a trial shall be had de novo with a
jury in the same manner as civil actions are tried.
171. The petitioner, Oscar E. Schneider, did not seek a trial on the criminal charges
against him, nor did he allege his competency to stand trial or to assist in his own defense.
The only relief requested was absolute release based on the unconstitutionality of § 32-
970 of the South Carolina Code.
172. Schneider v. State, 255 S.C. at 596, 180 S.E.2d at 341. If the court had reached
the constitutional issue, it appears that it would have had no choice but to find that § 32-
970 violated the principles enunciated in Baxstrom. See p. 792 & note 148 infra.
173. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
174. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 959.15 (1958), as amended Wis. STAT. ANN. § 975 (1971). This
statute allows commitment for examination. If the defendant is found in need of special
treatment, a hearing must be held to determine that need. If it can be established, the
court must commit the defendant for a period equal to the maximum sentence authorized
for the crime. At the end of the maximum sentence the Department of Health and Social
Services may petition the court for renewal, a hearing must be conducted and the court
must find the defendant "dangerous to the public."
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mitted to a facility at the state prison for sex deviates, rather than
receiving a sentence. 75 Since the commitment was in lieu of sent-
encing, the state argued that the same procedural safeguards
used for civil commitment were not required. Because the provi-
sions of the Sex Crimes Act limited the first period of confine-
ment to a term equal to the maximum allowable for the offense
for which the defendant was convicted, the Court seemed willing
to accept the State's position. However, the Court indicated that
in order for the confinement to be continued after service of the
maximum time allowable for the offense, all safeguards provided
for civil commitment should be enforced.
17 6
The Baxstrom decision clearly established that inmates
whose sentences had ended could not be committed under proce-
dures differing from those used to commit persons directly from
the community. In Schuster v. Herold'7 7 the court determined
that a New York prisoner could not be transferred to a facility for
the criminally insane unless he was committed through
"[s]ubstantially the same procedures including periodic review
of the need for continued commitment in a mental institution and
jury trial as are granted to civilians. . . ."involuntarily commit-
ted.7 8 In effect, the transfer of an inmate serving a sentence from
a prison to a facility for the mentally ill can only be completed
after a commitment hearing is conducted. Informal transfer ar-
rangements or transfers at the discretion of prison officials with-
out a commitment proceeding appear to be impermissible under
the Schuster decision. The court in Schuster found it significant
that a transfer would effectively eliminate the possibility of
Schuster's parole, increase the restraints on his activities, and
cause him to suffer indignities, frustrations and dangers that he
would not otherwise be required to endure in prison.' Though
this decision is not from the United States Supreme Court, it does
indicate the willingness of at least one circuit to extend the
Baxstrom principle to transfers of inmates from prisons to mental
health facilities.
175. The petitioner was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a
misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of one year's incarceration.
176. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. at 511.
177. 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969).
178. Id. at 1084.
179. Id. at 1078. It would seem apparent that an inmate's parole would be jeopardized
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D. Proposed Legislation
With the present South Carolina law and various judicial
pronouncements as a backdrop, it is possible to look at the
changes which will be required to bring our statutes into harmony
with the court decisions. As mentioned above, a bill 80 has been
introduced in the South Carolina Senate which, if enacted, will
make many needed improvements in our commitment statutes.
In the discussion of the proposed statutes, an effort will be made
to discuss the three types of criminal commitment, individually,
in a manner similar to that used to discuss the present law on
criminal commitment.
1. Competency'to Stand Trial
The first type of criminal commitment is concerned with
persons who, prior to trial, are held to be unfit or incompetent to
stand trial. The proposed statutory changes for commitment of
such persons would require a judge who believes a defendant
appearing before him is mentally ill to order an examination by
two designated examiners within fifteen days.' The designated
examiners must submit a written report reflecting their diagnosis
of the person's mental condition and their findings on the issue
of capacity to understand the proceedings against him and his
ability to assist in his own defense.'8 A finding of incompetency
must be accompanied by an opinion from the examiners stating
whether the defendant is likely to regain competency in the near
future.'113 Following this report, a full hearing is conducted in
which the defendant is provided with due process safeguards.', 4
If the defendant is competent to stand trial, criminal proceedings
will be resumed. However, if the examinee is found to be unfit' s'1
180. S.539, supra note 10.
181. S.539, § 32-970. This section also provides that an extension not to exceed
fifteen days may be obtained, if requested by the hospital superintendent because of the
inability of the hospital to complete the determination as to fitness within the first period.
182. S.539, § 32-971.
183. S.539, § 32-971(2).
184. S.539, § 32-972. The defendant and his counsel are entitled to notice of the
hearing, and the defendant is entitled to be present at the hearing.
185. In unofficial comments to an early draft of S.539, the drafters indicated that they
used the term "unfit" rather than "incompetent" to avoid confusion with the use of
"incompetent" in S.539, § 17 at § 32-1021.1, which refers to the determination after
commitment that a patient does not have the capacity to contract, sell or dispose of
property and in other ways manage his affairs. However, this section is not within the
scope of this paper. We have therefore taken the liberty of using "unfit" and "incompe-
[Vol. 25
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to stand trial and the examiners are of the opinion that he will
not regain competency in the foreseeable future,' 8 the solicitor
must initiate judicial commitment procedures like those required
under the proposed involuntary civil commitment statutes.'87 By
requiring the state to initiate judicial commitment proceedings,
the proposed statutes bring South Carolina into compliance with
the Supreme Court's decision in Baxstrom v. Herold.'"8
The report of the designated examiners is very important
because it carries tremendous weight in the court's competency
determination. A significant safeguard which is absent from both
the present and proposed South Carolina laws is worthy of note
here. Under criminal law in the federal courts,
No statement made by the accused in the course of any exami-
nation into his sanity or mental competency. . . , whether the
examination shall be with or without the consent of the accused,
shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the issue
of guilt in any criminal proceeding.'89
In essence, this safeguard means that the examiners are not al-
lowed to question the examinee to make a determination of his
competency to stand trial and then later reveal any information
they may have derived from the examinee regarding his criminal
responsibility for the offense with which he is charged. It seems
appropriate, therefore, to suggest that the proposed South Caro-
lina law include a specific requirement that different examiners
be utilized for determinations of competency and the defendant's
sanity at the time of the offense. Also, providing that information
derived at a competency examination would not be used against
the defendant should he plead insanity as a defense would insure
that the defendant could be completely open and cooperative at
the competency examination. Not only would this provision pro-
tect the defendant against self-incrimination, but it would also
tent" interchangeably in referring to the defendant's mental capacity to stand trial and
aid in his defense.
186. No mention is made as to what is regarded as within "the foreseeable future."
Clarification on this point would seem appropriate although there is some indicia of the
time frame contemplated by the drafters in S.539, § 32-972(3). That section provides that
a person found incompetent but likely to recover may be hospitalized for sixty additional
days and then evaluated for competency. Apparently sixty days is a reasonable period of
time and fits within the "foreseeable future" terminology.
187. See S.539, §§ 32-959 et seq.
188. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1969).
1974]
35
Pope and Cheney: Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A Proposal for Change
Published by Scholar Commons, 1974
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
insure that a more valid examination would result.' Although a
proposal for separate examiners may not be practical at the pres-
ent time because of the lack of qualified examiners, it seems a
provision which states specifically that each examination must be
limited solely to a determination of the condition for which the
examination was ordered would be useful."9' Under the proposed
judicial procedures available to those involuntarily committed, a
person who is found to be incompetent to stand trial and thus is
committed, may petition for a reexamination of his fitness. 1 3 This
petition may be initiated not only by the person committed but
also by his attorney, his legal guardian, the court, or the prosecut-
ing attorney. Upon petition, an examination by two designated
examiners shall be made and a report stating the underlying facts
and the examiners' finding will be submitted to the court. At that
time, the court will give ten days' notice for a hearing to be
conducted with the same procedural safeguards as provided in
the initial incompetency proceeding. A petition for reexamination
shall be dismissed by the court without a hearing if filed within
six months of a previous petition. It seems that the drafters
should have left the dismissal of such petitions within the discre-
tion of the court rather than providing for automatic dismissal.
Although it is unlikely that a reexamination conducted six
months later would be appropriate, the court is denied the flexi-
190. In an unpublished report a Justice Department Committee endorsed 18 U.S.C.
§ 4244 as it is presently written and stated in part:
When the same psychiatrist conducts an examination of the accused for both
purposes, [incompetency to stand trial and criminal responsibility], the dan-
gers of miscomprehension of the legal test for competency and possible conflicts
in the duties of the psychiatrist are frequently unavoidable.
One Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an incompetency examination which
is used for the purpose of obtaining evidence to rebut a defense of insanity
violates notions of fundamental fairness when the accused is not informed of the
purpose for the examination.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report of the Intra-Department Committee to Revise Chapter 313,
Title 18, U.S. Code 6 (undated). [The court to which the committee report referred was
the Second Circuit in its decision in U.S. v. Driscoll, 399 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1968).]
191. It should be noted that this concept is not new. This idea conveys the substance
of certain sections of S.1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3-1103, -1105 (1973), a bill now before
the United States Senate. Section 3-1103 requires that the scope of a competency hearing
be limited to the defendant's competency to stand trial, while section 3-1105 strictly limits
the scope of a determination of mental capacity to the defendant's mental condition at
the time of the offense. Section 3-1105(c) states that the same psychiatrist cannot conduct
both examinations.
192. S.539, § 32-959.
193. S.539, § 32-974.
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bility to deal with such a situation should the need arise. It should
be noted, however, that under no circumstances should the peti-
tion be denied if submitted six months or more after the previous
request, thereby ensuring the availability of review at six month
intervals.
Since a person found to be unfit to stand trial and unlikely
to regain competency within a reasonable time must be judicially
committed,' 94 it seems plausible that the notice provision regard-
ing the right to petition for a rehearing of the commitment order' '
would also apply to a petition for reexamination of competency.
This premise would appear to conform to the spirit of Baxstrom.
The proposed section on reexamination of competency'96 does not
charge the hospital superintendent with an affirmative duty to
notify the patient of his right to petition. Requiring such notifica-
tion seems appropriate to avoid confusion and ensure that all
patients receive equal procedural consideration.'91
Beyond this, the proposed statute would alter the present law
regarding indefinite commitment after a finding of incompe-
tency.'96 As stated earlier, the present law could easily subject a
person unfit to stand trial to lifelong commitment since the pa-
tient could be confined until he is competent, pending the further
orders of the court. The proposed statute provides that whenever
the hospital superintendent believes the patient is no longer in
need of hospitalization, he shall notify the court and a fitness
hearing shall be held' 99 at which the patient is entitled to have
counsel present. If the patient is found to be fit, the court must
decide whether to resume criminal proceedings. It may instead
dismiss the charges if so much time has elapsed that a discretion-
ary dismissal best serves the interests of justice.
Furthermore, if the person hospitalized has been confined for
a period exceeding the maximum period of imprisonment for the
194. This must be done, of course, in accordance with S.539, §§ 32-959 to -969.
195. S.539, § 32-969.
196. S.539, § 32-974.
197. If the intent of the drafters was to make a distinction between petitions to re-
examine commitment orders and petitions to re-examine competency to stand trial, a
violation of at least the spirit of Baxstrom seems inevitable. There is no reason for treating
petitioners in these two categories differently. It would be appropriate to add to S.539,
§ 32-974, a requirement that the hospital superintendent notify every patient and at least
one other interested person of the patient's right to petition.
198. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-970 (Cum. Supp. 1971). This section would be amended
by S.539, § 32-975.
199. The fitness hearing is conducted in accordance with S.539, § 32-972.
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offense charged, the court shall order the person released and the
charges dismissed .2 This addition is of monumental importance
to the person found fit because it provides him with credit for
time served. On the other hand, it seems that perhaps a slight
alteration would be even better. According to the proposed stat-
ute, "" the dismissal of charges after a person has served the maxi-
mum period of incarceration is granted only if the person confined
is found no longer in need of hospitalization. It would be prefera-
ble if all charges were automatically dropped when the maximum
period of confinement is reached without having to wait for the
competency petition, which might not issue from the superin-
tendent.
A bill "2" presently pending in the United States Senate sup-
ports an automatic dismissal of charges under federal jurisdic-
tion. The bill requires the court to dismiss the criminal charges
against an incompetent defendant on the final day of a "period
of time equal to the maximum term of imprisonment which he
would have had to serve, if he had been convicted of the most
serious offense with which he is charged. '23 As in the South Caro-
lina proposal, a finding that one is incompetent to stand trial and
unlikely to gain competency within a reasonable time' 4 requires
the initiation of civil commitment proceedings under the federal
proposal. It appears, however, that a person charged with a
crime, but found incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to re-
gain competency within a reasonable time, would have a slight
advantage under the federal proposal. If an incompetent defen-
dant is committed under federal jurisdiction, 25 the criminal
charges against him will be automatically dropped when he has
been confined for a period equal to the maximum time allowable
for the crime charged. Even though he would physically remain
confined because of civil commitment, he would automatically be
relieved of the additional burden, however slight, of carrying a
pending criminal charge. The federal and state proposals both
provide the same protection in that a person receives credit for
the time he was confined. In this sense, both proposals should be
200. S.539, § 32-975(2).
201. Id.
202. S.1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
203. Id. § 3-1004(a). Of course, in the interest of justice the court may dismiss the
charges at an earlier time.
204. Id. § 3-1108(a)(1) (1973).
205. Id. §§ 3-1104, 3-1108 (1973).
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noted as significant steps forward. The federal proposal is pre-
ferred, however, only because it would seem that any advantage,
even if it only lessens the burden of a pending criminal charge,
should be accorded to the person committed.
Even if the defendant is unfit to stand trial, the proposed
statutes "" provide that he may put forth a defense that is "sus-
ceptible of fair determination prior to trial and without the per-
sonal participation of the defendant.""2 7 This provision affords a
defendant with an opportunity to eradicate charges lodged
against him if his defense would entitle him to a directed verdict.
He may enter a request to present his defense without the jury's
presence, whereupon the charges against him will be dismissed if
the judge rules in his favor. Addition of this provision enforces the
idea of court action being with all due speed, thus remedying
cases which might otherwise linger unnecessarily because of the
defendant's incompetency. In accord with Jackson v. Indiana,"'
the proposed statute adopts the rationale that where possible it
is desirable to allow some judicial process despite the defendant's
incompetency. At the same time, the defendant's right to under-
stand the proceeding against him and to assist in his own defense
must also be adequately protected.
2. Insanity as a Defense
With one exception, the second subdivision in the criminal
area concerning commitment of persons who have used insanity
as a successful defense is not included in the proposed statutes.
Since insanity is a complete defense in South Carolina, a defen-
dant found to have been insane at the time the offense was com-
mitted is considered not guilty. There is no mandatory commit-
ment of such persons in this state, but commitment can be ef-
fected at the judge's discretion.2 11 Under the proposed statutes
persons found not guilty would have to be committed by volun-
tary commitment or involuntary judicial commitment like other
persons in the community. However, since the proposed statutes
eliminate the possibility of indefinite commitment of such per-
sons as allowed under the present law, 210 a new provision has been
206. S.539, § 32-973.
207. Id.
208. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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added which is directed specifically to the insanity defense. 21' It
provides for the examination of the defendant who pleads mental
illness or deficiency as a defense. Should such illness or deficiency
be found and hospitalization be required, judicial commitment
procedures '1 2 must be completed before the person may be de-
tained further in a state hospital. A defendant who is found not
to be responsible for his actions at the time of the offense is not
necessarily incompetent or mentally ill at the time of trial and
cannot be automatically committed on such a finding. Bolton v.
Harris2 1' supports the idea that a defendant should be held only
for a brief period of examination; if he must be confined for a
longer period, regular civil commitment must be instituted. The
new statutory proposal" 4 provides added protection for the defen-
dant found not responsible for his actions at the time of the of-
fense and ensures that commitment of such a person is based
solely on his present mental condition.
3. Prior Conviction
The final type of commitment concerns persons already in
prison serving sentences for criminal convictions. The proposed
statute makes alterations in the procedures for continuing an
inmate after completion of his sentence at the Department of
Mental Health's prison facility and transfer of an inmate from
the Department of Corrections to a state hospital.
Under the statutory proposals, an inmate cannot be held
past the expiration of his sentence.2 15 The judicial commitment
process for a person whose sentence is ending must be initiated
prior to the completion of the sentence 216 rather than at the termi-
211. S.639, § 32-983.
212. This procedure must be in accordance with S.539, § 32-959.
213. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See discussion of this case pp. 792-93 supra.
214. S.539, § 32-983,
215. S.539, § 32-976.
216. It is interesting to note that in both the present and proposed statutes a person
judicially committed in accordance with this section can be committed only when found
to be mentally ill and potentially dangerous to himself or others if returned to society.
No mention is made of committing such persons on the ground that they need treatment
and lack sufficient insight or capacity to decide responsibly concerning their admission
to a hospital. [See § 32-963 of the current code and § 32-965 of S.539 in this regard.]
Because of this omission it is assumed that only those found dangerous at the end of their
sentence can be retained in Department of Mental Health facilities. The parens patriae
provision of section 32-963(2) is not available here although it is available for persons
40
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nation of the sentence. This change prevents the inmate from
having to await the court's decision on commitment after his
sentence has been completed. The proposal also forbids commit-
ting an ex-inmate to the mental health facility at the prison after
his sentence has terminated.
2
11
Transfers from the Department of Corrections to the facility
operated by the Department of Mental Health at the penitentiary
may be effected only after judicial commitment. 2 1 Thus, the in-
formal transfer procedures which are now in effect 29 can no longer
be used. However, there does seem to be one problem in the
proposed statute221 which should be corrected. As the statute is
presently written, judicial commitment is required only if an
inmate is moved from the general prison population into the De-
partment of Mental Health's prison unit. Therefore, an inmate
could technically be transferred to another mental health facility
outside the prison without judicial commitment. It would be bet-
ter to amend the wording so that an inmate moved to any Depart-
ment of Mental Health facility, inside or outside of the peniten-
tiary, is judicially committed prior to the transfer. The present
system of transfer in South Carolina seems violative of the intent
of the decision in Schuster v. Herold.22 1' Although Schuster was
decided in another circuit, the holding of the court certainly
seems fair and reasonable, and one which should be followed if
an inmate is to receive the same protections that persons in the
community receive . 22
committed from the community. Of course, once an inmate is released, he could qualify
for the parens patriae provision of section 32-963(2) and could then be admitted to a
mental health facility.
217. S.539, § 32-976. The place designated to house committed ex-offenders must be
determined on the same basis as the place of confinement of other civilly committed
persons.
218. S.539, § 32-977.
219. See p. 790 supra.
220. S.539, § 32-977.
221. 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969).
222. In regard to the mental health facility at the Central Correctional Institution in
Columbia, S.C., it could be argued that an inmate is only being moved from one area of
the prison to another. However, it seems clear that such a move carries more importance
than that would imply. It could, in fact, greatly change the inmate's status and no doubt
affect his parole. In short, the same constitutional problems would arise by such an intra-
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IV. CONCLUSION
Three different aspects of "civil" and "criminal" involuntary
commitment have been explored in this article: (1) the current
South Carolina procedures; (2) recent cases which tend to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of these procedures; and (3) the pro-
posed South Carolina bill which would restructure the present
commitment process. Although this proposal has far-reaching
implications for the entire mental health field, this study has
focused on but a few sections of the bill, those primarily dealing
with due process considerations in the commitment procedure.
A discussion of the current commitment law, recent cases
and proposed legislation leads to the conclusion that some change
in this area is required. Of necessity, commitment of the mentally
ill is a procedure that must be regulated. To fulfill this need the
legislature has provided statutes which, unfortunately, are overly
broad and therefore ineffective. Thus, the burden of ensuring due
process safeguards to the committed has shifted from the legisla-
ture to the Department of Mental Health and to some extent the
courts. This has produced varied interpretations and has left the
process open to possible abuses. The proposed commitment pro-
cedure was drafted in response to this problem.
This proposal offers important changes and innovations in
the area of civil and criminal commitment in South Carolina. The
bill as presently written, however, has some problems in drafting
that should be corrected. It is also suggested that some additional
provisions be incorporated to maximize the impact of the legisla-
tion. The most progressive response to the problem of the men-
tally ill seems to be in the area of alternatives to confinement in
a mental hospital, as suggested by the present California Code.
This approach was ignored by the drafters in conceiving the cur-
rent proposal, apparently a realization of the limited financial
resources of the South Carolina Department of Mental Health.
Despite the omissions of this proposal, it still affords the legisla-










Selected Portions of S.539, a Bill Relating to the Commitment,
Admission and Discharge of Persons from Mental Institutions § 3
(1973):
Section 32-955. Any individual may, subject to the availabil-
ity of suitable accommodations, be admitted to a State hospital
upon:
(1) Written application to the hospital by any person stating
his belief that the individual is mentally ill and, because of his
condition is likely to cause injury to himself or others if not imme-
diately restrained and the grounds for this relief;
(2) A certification, in triplicate, by at least one licensed phy-
sician that he has examined the individual and is of the opinion
that the individual is mentally ill and, because of his condition,
is likely to injure himself or others if not immediately restrained.
Such certification shall contain the grounds for such opinion.
An individual with respect to whom such a certificate has
been issued may not be admitted on the basis thereof at any time
after the expiration of three calendar days after the date of exami-
nation; and
(3) Within three to five calendar days of the individual's
admission, a preliminary hearing shall be held before the probate
court of the county in which the individual resides or was present,
at which hearing the proposed patient shall be present and shall
be represented by counsel either retained by himself or appointed
by the court. If the court finds that probable cause exists that the
individual is mentally ill and, because of his condition, is likely
to injure himself or others if not restrained, it shall order that the
individual be detained at a State hospital and shall fix a date for
and give notice of a full hearing, pursuant to Section 32-956, to
be held within fifteen days from the date of the preliminary hear-
ing. The full hearing shall be held pursuant to Section 32-964.
Section 32-956. At least ten days prior to the full hearing
scheduled by the court pursuant to Section 32-955 (3), written
notice shall be given to the patient and to his counsel, the appli-
cant, and other interested person [sic]. Notice shall include
date, time, and place of the hearing, the basis for the patient's
detention (conclusions and underlying facts) and the standard
upon which he has been detained. The notice of hearing shall also
include a statement advising the recipient that the proposed pa-
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tient has the right to request the names of designated examiners
and all other persons who may testify in favor of his continued
detention, and the substance of their proposed testimony.
Section 32-957. If a person believed to be mentally ill and,
because of his condition, likely to injure himself or others if not
restrained cannot be examined by at least one licensed physician
pursuant to Section 32-955 by reason of the fact that his wherea-
bouts are unknown or for any other reason, the petitioner seeking
commitment pursuant to Section 32-955 shall execute an affida-
vit stating that he believes the person to be mentally ill and,
because of his condition, likely to injure himself or others if not
restrained and the ground for such belief, and stating that the
usual procedure for examination cannot be followed and the rea-
son therefor. Upon presentation of such an affidavit, the judge of
probate for the county in which the person is present may require
any officer of the peace to take the person into custody for a
period not exceeding twenty-four hours during which detention
he shall be examined by at least one licensed physician as pro-
vided for in Section 32-955 (2); provided, that the person taken
into custody shall have the right to representation by an attorney.
If within the twenty-four hours the person in custody is not exam-
ined by a licensed physician or, if upon examination, the physi-
cian does not execute the certification provided for in Section 32-
955 (2), the proceedings shall be terminated and the person in
custody shall be immediately released. Otherwise proceedings
shall be held pursuant to Section 32-955 (3).
Section 32-958. The certification required by Section 32-955
(2) shall authorize and require any officer of the peace, preferably
in civilian clothes, to take the individual into custody and trans-
port him to a State hospital.
Section 32-959. Proceedings for the involuntary hospitaliza-
tion of an individual may be commenced by the filing of a written
petition with the probate court of the county in which he is pres-
ent by any interested person or the superintendent of any public
or private mental institution in which the individual may be.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certificate of a desig-
nated examiner stating that he has examined the individual and
is of the opinion that he is mentally ill and should be hospitalized
or a written statement by the petitioner that the individual has
refused to submit to an examination by a designated examiner.
The certificate, or the written statement, shall state the underly-
ing facts upon which the designated examiner or the petitioner,
[Vol. 25
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if the individual has refused to submit to an examination, bases
his conslusions [sic] and not merely the conclusions themselves.
Provided, that the individual shall have the right to demand
removal of the proceedings to any other county of the State when
the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice so re-
quire. When the place of the proceedings is changed all other
proceedings shall be had in the county to which the place of
hearing is changed, unless otherwise provided by the consent of
the parties in writing, duly filed, or order of the court. And the
papers shall be filed or transferred accordingly.
Section 32-960. Upon receipt of a petition the court shall give
notice thereof to the proposed patient, to his legal guardian, if
any, and to any other interested person. This notice shall also
indicate the proposed patient's right to counsel.
Section 32-961. Within three days after notice of the comm-
encement of the proceedings is given, the court shall appoint two
designated examiners to examine the proposed patient and report
to the court their findings as to his mental condition and his need
for treatment in a hospital. The examination shall be had at a
suitable place not likely to have a harmful effect upon the pro-
posed patient's health. On the report of the designated examiners
of refusal to submit to examination the court shall order him to
submit to examination. An adequate record of the examination
shall be made and offered to the proposed patient's counsel. If the
conclusions of the examination are that the individual is mentally
ill, the underlying facts shall be recorded as well as the conclu-
sions. The proposed patient shall be given the opportunity to
request an additional examination by an independent designated
examiner. If the court determines that the proposed patient is
indigent, such examination shall be conducted at public expense.
Section 32-962. If the report of the designated examiners is
to the effect that they are of the opinion that the proposed patient
is mentally ill, the court shall forthwith fix a date for and give
notice of a hearing to be held not less than five nor more than
twenty days from receipt of the report. If the report of the examin-
ers is divided or is to the effect that they are of the opinion that
the proposed patient is not mentally ill, the court shall terminate
the proceedings and dismiss the petition.
If a full hearing is to be held, the court shall assure itself that
the proposed patient has counsel; if he is unable to obtain coun-
sel, the court shall appoint counsel for him.
Section 32-963. Notice of the hearing shall be given to the
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proposed patient, to his counsel, and to any other interested per-
son at least ten days prior to the hearing. Notice shall include the
date, time, and place of the hearing, the underlying facts and the
conclusions of the designated examiner's report, and the standard
under which the proposed patient is sought to be committed. The
notice of hearing shall also include a statement advising the re-
cipient that the proposed patient has the right to request the
names of the designated examiners and all other persons who may
testify in favor of his commitment, and the substance of their
proposed testimony.
Section 32-964. All persons to whom notice is required may
appear at the hearing, testify and, within the discretion of the
court, present and cross-examine witnesses, and the court may
receive the testimony of any other person. The court may exclude
all persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings. The
proposed patient shall have the right to be present at the commit-
ment hearing; such right shall be waivable only by the proposed
patient or his attorney. The hearing shall be conducted in as
informal a manner as may be consistent with orderly procedure
and in a physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect on
the mental health of the proposed patient. The court shall in
receiving evidence follow the rules of evidence applicable to the
probate courts of South Carolina. At the conclusion of the hear-
ing, the proposed patient shall have the right to a free transcript
of the record of the proceedings if he is indigent.
Section 32-965. If, upon completion of the hearing and con-
sideration of the record, the court finds upon clear and convincing
evidence that the proposed patient is mentally ill, and:
(1) Is in need of treatment in a hospital, and because of his
condition lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible
decisions with respect to his admittance to a hospital; or
(2) Because of his condition is likely to injure himself or
others.
Section 32-968. The petitioner or the proposed patient may
appeal from any order of the probate court issued pursuant to
Section 32-965 or Section 32-1021 to the court of common pleas
of the county, and the matter shall be heard by any circuit judge
having jurisdiction in the county upon the record of the probate
court, with such additional evidence as such judge shall require,
and such judge shall make a determination as to whether the
order of the probate judge shall be affirmed or reversed. Such
appeal shall not stay the order of the probate judge, but the
810 [Vol. 25
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hearing herein provided shall be held within ten days after notice
of appeal, failing which the order of the probate judge shall be
vitiated.
Appeal by either party to the Supreme Court shall be from
the order of the circuit judge as in other civil cases, except that
an order of a circuit judge requiring release of the proposed pa-
tient shall be of force and effect unless and until it is reversed by
the Supreme Court.
Section 32-969. Any patient confined pursuant to Sections
32-959 through 32-968 shall be entitled to a re-examination of the
order for his confinement on his own petition, or that of any other
interested person, to the probate court of the county from which
he was admitted. The superintendent of the hospital shall inform
every patient, and at least one other interested person, of his right
to petition. Such notice shall be given in writing at the beginning
of each six-month interval during the confinement of the patient.
Upon receipt of the petition, the court shall conduct proceedings
in accordance with Sections 32-959 through 32-968 except that
the proceedings shall not be required to be conducted if the peti-
tion is filed sooner than six months after the issuance of the order
of confinement or sooner than six months after the filing of a
previous petition under this section. The costs shall be borne by
the petitioner, unless the court determines that he cannot afford
such costs.
Section 32-970. Whenever a judge of the circuit court, county
court, or family court has reason to believe that a person on trial
before him, charged with the commission of a criminal offense,
is not fit to stand trial because such person lacks the capacity to
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own
defense as a result of mental illness or deficiency, the judge shall:
(1) Order examination of such person by two designated
examiners (such examination shall be made within fifteen days
after the court's order), or
(2) Order such person committed for examination and ob-
servation to a State hospital for a period not to exceed fifteen
days. If at the end of fifteen days the State hospital has been
unable to determine whether the person is fit to stand trial the
superintendent of the hospital shall request in writing an addi-
tional period for observation not to exceed fifteen days.
If such person or his counsel so requests, the person may be
examined additionally by a designated examiner of his choice. If
the court determines that the person is indigent, the examination
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by such additional examiner shall be at public expense. The re-
port of such examination shall be admissible as evidence in sub-
sequent hearings pursuant to Section 32-972. Provided, that the
court may prescribe the time and conditions under which such
independent examination is conducted.
Section 32-971. Within five days of examination under Sec-
tion 32-970 (1) or at the conclusion of the observation period
under Section 32-970 (2), the designated examiners shall make a
written report to the court which shall include:
(1) A diagnosis of the person's mental condition, and
(2) Clinical findings bearing on the issues of whether or not
the person is capable of understanding the proceedings against
him and assisting in his own defense, and, if in the opinion of the
designated examiners he does lack such capacity, whether or not
he is likely to recover such capacity in the foreseeable future.
Section 32-972. Upon receiving the report of the designated
examiners the court shall set a date for and notify the person and
his counsel of a hearing on the issue of his fitness to stand trial.
The person shall be entitled to be present at such hearing and to
be represented by counsel. If upon completion of the hearing and
consideration of the evidence the court finds that:
(1) The person is fit to stand trial, then it shall order crimi-
nal proceedings resumed; or
(2) The person is unfit to stand trial for the reasons set forth
in Section 32-970 and is unlikely to become fit to stand trial in
the foreseeable future, then the solicitor responsible for the crimi-
nal prosecution shall initiate judicial admission proceedings pur-
suant to Sections 32-959 through 32-969; or
(3) The person is unfit to stand trial but likely to become
fit in the foreseeable future, then the court shall order him hospi-
talized for an additional sixty days. If the person is found to be
unfit at the conclusion of this additional period, then the solicitor
responsible for the criminal prosecution shall initiate judicial
admission proceedings pursuant to Sections 32-959 through 32-
969.
Subject to the provisions of Section 32-975, patients against
whom criminal charges are pending shall have all the rights and
privileges of other involuntarily hospitalized patients.
Persons against whom criminal charges are pending but who
are not ordered hospitalized following judicial admission proceed-
ings shall be released.
Section 32-973. A finding of unfitness to stand trial under
[Vol. 25
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Section 32-972 does not preclude any legal objection to the prose-
cution of the individual which is susceptible of fair determination
prior to trial and without the personal participation of the defen-
dant.
If either the person found unfit to stand trial or his counsel
believes he can establish a defense of not guilty to the charges
other than the defense of insanity, he may request an opportunity
to offer a defense on the merits to the court. The court may
require affidavits and evidence in support of such request. If the
court grants such request, the evidence of the state and the defen-
dant shall be heard before the court sitting without a jury. If after
hearing such petition the court finds the evidence is such as
would entitle the defendant to a directed verdict of acquittal, it
shall dismiss the indictment or other charges.
Section 32-974. A finding of unfitness to stand trial under
Section 32-972 may be re-examined by the court upon its own
motion, or that of the prosecuting attorney, the person found
unfit to stand trial, his legal guardian, or his counsel. Upon re-
ceipt of the petition, the court shall order an examination by two
designated examiners whose report shall be submitted to the
court and shall include underlying facts and conclusions. The
court shall notify the individual, his legal guardian, and his coun-
sel of a hearing at least ten days prior to such hearing. The court
shall conduct the proceedings in accordance with Section 32-972,
except that any petition that is filed within six months after the
initial finding of unfitness or within six months after the filing of
a previous petition under this section shall be dismissed by the
court without a hearing.
Section 32-975. When the superintendent of a State Hospital
believes that a person against whom criminal charges are pending
no longer requires hospitalization, the court shall be notified and
shall set a date for and notify the person of a hearing on the issue
of fitness pursuant to Section 32-972. At such time, the person
shall be entitled to assistance of counsel.
(1) If upon the completion of the hearing, the court finds
the person unfit to stand trial, it shall order his release.
(2) If such a person has been hospitalized for a period of
time exceeding the maximum possible period of imprisonment to
which the person could have been sentenced if convicted as
charged, the court shall order the charges dismissed and the per-
son released.
(3) The court may order that criminal proceedings against
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a person who has been found fit to stand trial be resumed, or the
court may dismiss criminal charges and order the person released
if so much time has elapsed that prosecution would not be in the
interest of justice.
Section 32-976. Prior to the expiration of a sentence of any
person who is imprisoned in any portion of a state correctional
institution designated as a facility of the South Carolina Depart-
ment of Mental Health, if the superintendent of the correctional
institution believes that such person is mentally ill and a poten-
tial danger to himself or others if returned to society, he shall
commence proceedings in the probate court of the county where
the person was last sentenced, pursuant to Section 32-959, and
any other applicable provisions of law. If the court shall find such
person mentally ill and potentially dangerous to himself or others
if returned to society, it shall order his hospitalization in a non-
penitentiary mental health facility.
Section 32-977. If any person is serving a sentence in a State
correctional institution and the superintendent of such institu-
tion applies to have that person transferred to the portion of a
State correctional institution designated as a facility of the De-
partment of Mental Health, the superintendent shall file such
application with the probate court of the county in which the
correctional institution is located. Proceedings shall be comm-
enced pursuant to Sections 32-959 through 32-696.
Section 32-983. In any criminal proceedings where mental
illness or mental deficiency is raised as a defense:
(1) The court may order the examination of a defendant
who has asserted the defense of mental illness or mental defi-
ciency by a designated examiner, or may order such defendant
hospitalized for examination and observation for a period not to
exceed twenty days.
(2) A defendant who has asserted the defense of mental
illness or mental deficiency and who is indigent shall be entitled
to be examined by a designated examiner of his choice at public
expense.
If the court believes that a person who has been adjudged not
to be responsible for his criminal conduct because of mental ill-
ness or mental deficiency requires hospitalization, it shall order
the initiation of judicial admission proceedings pursuant to Sec-
tion 32-959 and may detain such person pending the outcome of
such proceedings. If such person is found not to require hospitali-
zation, the court shall order his release.
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Section 32-1021.1. A separate finding pertaining to the com-
petency or incompetency of the proposed patient shall be made
after and only after the person has been committed, if commit-
ment is the court's decision. Commitment shall not raise a pre-
sumption of incompetency.
No rights shall be denied an individual unless specifically
ordered by the court.
The court is empowered to appoint a committee pursuant to
Sections 32-1035 through 32-1041 for custody and control of the
patient's estate and to make such further orders pertaining to the
patient's legal status and property as may be necessary following
a judgment of incompetency.
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